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ABSTRACT
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on Public Health, dealing with access to
medicines for countries lacking the manufacturing capacity for them, became an
important issue because its solution on 30th August 2003 on the basis of the Note of
the Chairman of the TRIPS Council was perceived as changing the basic features of
the TRIPS Agreement. This was the subject of much debate, and a number of
proposals from different countries were submitted either individually or collectively.
However, the proposals from developing countries did not find their way into
Paragraph 6, and the problem of developing countries not being able to make their
voices heard in international negotiations is the focus of this article. By discussing
the circumstances of the Paragraph Solution and the ways in which the interests of
the developed countries were prioritised over the interests of developing countries,
this article attempts to find ways in which the negotiating process may be made
more transparent in future so as to accommodate all interests more fairly.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Access to medicines for underdeveloped countries has always been a crucial issue,
and it became especially controversial after the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)1 was finalised in 1995. The controversy has
acquired particular significance in the wake of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, particularly
given its prevalence in many parts of the world which are not in a position to
manufacture the required drugs to treat the disease.2 The issue of access to medicines
for such nations came to the fore during the Doha Ministerial Meet, where the
developing countries present moved a resolution for an authoritative interpretation
of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement for the purpose of clarification so as to avoid
unnecessary litigation in situations where countries permit manufacture and export
of drugs to countries which lack the requisite capacity, especially to those countries
which were in the grip of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. However, this simple and TRIPScompatible approach was not accepted, and a strict regulatory regime was imposed
through various means, the failure of which becomes evident when one finds that no
medicines at all have been exported since August 30, 2003 under this solution.3 In
fact, countries such as Canada have even tried to undermine it through first permitting
the patent-holder to take over export after the completion of the negotiation between
the country in need and the third-party supplier, and then limiting the scope of
diseases, another bone of contention.4
An issue of crucial importance to the lack of access to medicines for developing
countries is thus their marginalisation in international treaty negotiations, which is
evident from the introduction of industrial and other monopolies as a part of the

1

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].

2

WTO Secretariat, Available Information on Manufacturing Capacity for Medicines, IP/C/
W/345 (May 24, 2002), http://www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/fileviewer?id=33236.

3

According to certain WHO officials, no country has yet issued a demand for compulsory
licences as authorised by the paragraph 6 solution of August 30, 2003. It has also been
reported that the complexity of the Solution, along with the pressure on the needy countries
not to take advantage of it, are the factors responsible for its non-use. UNI, Poor Nations
Fail to Import HIV Generics, available at http://www.union-network.org/uniafrican.nsf/
574a89c88160dd42c125682c0046d1c8/55c62506e7488140c1256e510040819f?
OpenDocument.

4

See Bill C-56, An Act to Amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act, S.C. 2004, c. 23,
available at http://www.aidslaw.ca/Maincontent/issues/cts/patent-amend/BillC9passed40504.pdf.
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WTO through TRIPS,5 restrictive interpretations of the flexibility of this Agreement6
and its rewriting on August 30, 20037 in the form of the solution of Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration on Public Health,8 which added exports as one of the patenting
rights in the TRIPS Agreement. The solution has drastically curtailed the possibilities
of access to drugs being given to countries which lack the manufacturing capacity for
them.9 This inability of developing countries to participate effectively in international
treaty negotiations is reflected in a number of proposals from developing countries
requesting developed countries, primarily the USA, not to resort to threats and

5

See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World:
Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 689 (1989) (discussing two relevant documents: General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade: Decisions on Negotiating Structure and Plans for the Uruguay Round, 26 I.L.M.
850 (1987), and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Decisions Adopted at the MidTerm Review of the Uruguay Round, 28 I.L.M. 1025 (1989)).

6

WTO Dispute Panel Report on Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
7428d.pdf [hereinafter Canada Patent Protection].

7

WTO, Decision of 30 August 2003, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (30.8.2003), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/implem_para6_e.htm. [hereinafter Decision of August 30,
2003]. See also The General Council Chairperson’s Statement, Aug. 8, 2003, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/TRIPS_stat_28aug03_e.htm [hereinafter the
Chairperson’s Statement].

8

Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/Dec/2 [hereinafter
Doha Declaration], available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
mindecl_TRIPS_e.pdf (Nov. 14, 2001).

9

The inability of WTO Members to use the Decision of August 30, 2003 to access requisite
medicines becomes evident in the new proposal from the African Group submitted to the
TRIPS Council. The African Group has argued that the Chairman’s Statement does not
provide any legal value and should be removed completely from the Decision of August 30,
2003. They also argued that the conditions imposed through the Decision of August 30,
2003 are neither practical nor required and that article 31 conditions are sufficient to cover
any question of quantity of medicines to be produced and its diversion to wrong countries.
However, the amendment protocol arrived at on December 6, 2005 does not appear to take
into account any of the concerns raised by the African countries. WTO, The TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health, Communication from Rwanda on Behalf of the African Group (IP/C/W/
2005 dated Apr. 6, 2005) and Legal Arguments to Support the African Group Proposal on
the Implementation of Paragraph 11 of the 30th August Decision, Communication from
Rwanda on behalf of the African Group (IP/C/W/440 dated Mar. 1, 2005); Proposal for a
Decision on an Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, Implementation of paragraph 11 of
the General Council Decision of 30th August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Proposal for a Decision
on an Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/41 dated Dec. 6, 2005).
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sanctions in international transactions.10 The problem has been discussed by a number
of scholars with widely differing viewpoints, sometimes influenced by their own
nationalities.11 While Gathii tries to explain it as the use of structural power by
developed countries,12 Drahos is more inclined to attribute the limitation of developing
countries to participate effectively in international negotiations to their inability to
form a coherent group.13
This article concentrates on the Paragraph 6 Solution of the Doha Declaration
on Public Health and the position of developing countries in international negotiations
in the context of the effects of the HIV pandemic. In the course of this article, I will
touch upon a number of factors relevant to this issue, such as the concept of
enablement, the relevance of Articles 30 and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement in relation
to export of the patented products, the legality of the Paragraph 6 Solution, and the
issue of repression, exclusion and disorganisation of the developing countries at
international negotiations. I will also attempt to analyse the actual process of
domination, and thus arrive at possible ways to improve international negotiations
involving developing countries.

II. THE HIV PANDEMIC AND ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES
The extent of the problem caused by diseases like AIDS can be gauged from some
of the reports providing the relevant data. The UNAIDS Report says that there have
been 20 million deaths from AIDS in the twenty years since the first diagnosis of
AIDS in 1981, with young people in the age group of 15-24 accounting for nearly half

10

TRIPS: Proposal-Draft Ministerial Declaration: Proposal from a Group of Developing
Countries, IP/C/W/312 dated Oct. 4, 2001, addressed to General Council and Council for
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Proposals by the African Group,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and
Venezuela, [hereinafter Developing Countries’ Proposal, Oct. 4, 2001) available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/mindecdraft_w312_e.htm, 10.

11

See generally James T. Gathii, The Structured Power of Strong Pharmaceutical Patent
Protection in US Foreign Policy, 7 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 267 (2003); Peter Drahos, When
the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the WTO, 8 INT’L NEGOTIATION 79 (2003);
A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS – Natural Rights and a “Polite Form of Economic Imperialism,” 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 415 (1996).

12

See Gathii, supra note 11.

13

See Drahos, supra note 11.
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of all new infections worldwide, and almost 38 million people are living with AIDS.14
Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 25 million of these 38 million – approximately 68%
of world’s AIDS sufferers – whereas it is home to only 10% of the world’s population,
although there is a diversity across the African continent in the levels and trends of
HIV infection.15 Among Asian countries, China, Indonesia and Vietnam account for
another 7.4 million HIV sufferers, followed by India with nearly 5 million infected
people.16 The AIDS/HIV pandemic has reversed the gradual growth in life expectancy
in sub-Saharan Africa.17 According to the WHO, nearly 6 million people are expected
to die because of this disease in the near future if they do not receive treatment—a
staggering number by any account.18 According to the WHO’s estimates, only 400,000
people were able to receive treatment by the end of 2003.19 Out of this 400,000,
access to medicines for HIV in the African region is the lowest with only an estimated
100,000 people receiving treatment, a coverage of just 2%.20
The World Health Report paints a bleak picture of the economic and social
consequences of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.21 The economic effect of such devastation
is already visible; even the economy of Nigeria, a relatively prosperous country with
petroleum wealth, is shrinking rather than expanding,22 and Prof. Clive Bell and others,
on the basis of significant importance given to human capital and transmission
14

UNAIDS, REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 3, available at http://www.unaids.org/
bangkok2004/GAR2004_html?GAR2004_oo_en.htm. With the margin of error provided,
the figure could be anything between 34.6 million and 42.3 million.

15

See id.

16

See id.

17

WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION, WORLD HEALTH REPORT, 2004 at 2 (2004), available at http://
www.who.inv/whr/2004 [hereinafter WORLD HEALTH REPORT, 2004]. See also UNITED NATIONS,
WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2002 REVISION (2003) (noting that the life expectancy in
sub-Saharan region reached a high of 49.2 years during the late 1980s and projecting it to
drop to just under 46 years in the period 2004-2005).

18

See WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION, UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITY TO FIGHT HIV/AIDS AND CHANGE
THE COURSE OF HISTORY (2004), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/releases/2004/
pr33/en/print.html.

19

See id.

20

See WORLD HEALTH REPORT, 2004.

21

See id. at 8. See also Simon Dixon et al., The Impact of HIV and AIDS on Africa’s Economic
Development, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 232 (2002); Economic Commission for Africa, Africa: The
Socio-Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS, available at http://www.ace.msu.edu/agecon/fs2/
adult_death/SOCIO_ECO_IMPACT.pdf; Botswana Institute for Development Policy
Analysis, Impacts of HIV/AIDS on Poverty and Income Inequality in Botswana, available
at http://www.iaen.org/coonferences/durbansym/papers/31Green.pdf.

22

See Constance Ndubuisi-Enyali, Nigerian Economy to Shrink by 20% due to HIV/AIDS, at
the 4th National Conference on HIV AIDS in Africa (May 7, 2004) available at http://
www.Nigeria-aids.org/msgRead.cfm?ID=2901.
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mechanism across generations, have argued that the long-run economic costs of AIDS
are going to be devastating for South Africa.23 By affecting young people, AIDS reduces
family and national resources and exacerbates economic inequality. Economic welfare
is therefore necessarily dependent on the health of the population.24 In the context of
the Asia-Pacific religion, the impact of HIV/AIDS on households and businesses is
expected to be disastrous, not only because the death and incapacitation of workers

23

See generally CLIVE BELL ET AL., THE LONG-RUN ECONOMIC COSTS OF AIDS: THEORY AND AN
APPLICATION TO SOUTH AFRICA 5 (2003), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/
30343_wps3152.pdf; C. Arndt & J. D. Lewis, The Macro Implications of HIV/AIDS in South
Africa: A Preliminary Assessment, 68 SOUTH AFRICA J. ECO. 856, 887 (2000); R. Dorrington
et al., The Current State and Future Projections of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in South Africa,
57 SOUTH AFRICAN DENTAL J. 408, 409 (2002); and R. Dorrington et al., Some Impacts of
HIV/AIDS on Adult Mortality in South Africa, 15 (Supp 2) SOUTH AFRICAN J. CLINICAL NUTRITION
S3 (2002); South African Institute of Race Relations, The Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS,
available at http://www.sairr.org.za; John S. Nabila et al., A Preliminary Review of the
Economic Impact of AIDS on Firms and Business in Ghana available at http://
www.policyproject.com/pubs/country reports/GHeconimp.pdf (Oct. 1, 2000); UNAIDS, THE
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF HIV/AIDS IN POOR COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF STUDIES AND
LESSONS (T. Barnett et al., eds., 2000); M. BECHARA & O. WEEKS, AIDS: AN ECONOMIC CATASTROPHE?
(2000); L. BOLLINGER & J. STOVER, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AIDS, (1999) (Bollinger and Stover
have done systematic analysis of the economic impact on a number of African countries)
available at http://www.policyproject.com/pubs/SEImpact/angola.pdf; M. Butler et al.,
The Socioeconomic Impact of HIV/AIDS in the Dominican Republic, 1991-2005, at the 13th
International AIDS Conference, Durban (2000); ING Barings, Economic Impacts of AIDS
in South Africa: A Dark Cloud on the Horizon, (ING Barings, Johannesburg), 2000; P.
Wehrwein, The Economic Impact of AIDS in Africa, HARV. AIDS REV., Fall Winter 1999, at 4
available at http://www.aids.harvard.edu/news_publications/har/fall_win_1999-4.html;
Edoardo Gaffeo, The Economics of HIV/AIDS: A Survey, 21 DEV. POL. REV. 27 (2003) (The
extent of the negative effect of AIDS varies between the studies as the forecastings depend
significantly on the assumptions but even the most optimistic assumptions such as those in
the ING Barings’ study confirm a significant negative impact of HIV pandemic on the
countries concerned particularly those in Africa).

24

See D. Bloom & D. Canning, Health and the Wealth of Nations, 287 SCIENCE 1207 (2000).
Also see D. Bloom & D. Canning, The Effect of Health on Economic Growth: Theory and
Evidence, NBER Working Paper No. 8357 available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w8357.pdf; D. Bloom & D. Canning, Health as Human Capital and its Impact on Economic
performance, 28 GENEVA PAPERS 304, 315 (2003); WHO, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH (2002) available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/
WHA55/ea555.pdf. (the WHO Report on Macroeconomics and Health headed by Jeffrey
Sachs estimated that in Sub-Saharan Africa, the loss due to HIV/AIDS is more than 12% of
GNP annually and that in malaria-free regions, the growth is more by 1% compared to
malaria-ridden regions); WHO CMH, Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health
for Economic Development, available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidcmh/
CMHReport.PDF.

2006]

DAYA SHANKER

15

would reduce household income, but because the reduced income and resulting
decreases in demand would inhibit economic growth as a whole.25
The response of countries in a position to contribute substantially towards dealing
with such a potential catastrophe has either been negative or negligible. Some of them,
such as the USA, Japan and the members of the European Community, contributed
to the global fund,26 but have then nullified its effect by restricting access to medicines
through the exclusion of a number of sources of supply on the plea that such access
would undermine the patenting monopoly and thus future R&D.27

25

Symposium, The Potential Economic Impact of AIDS in Asia and the Pacific at Asia-Pacific
Ministerial Meeting in Melbourne, (Oct. 9, 2001) available at http://www.ausaid.gov.au/
pupblications/pdf/patential_impact.pdf.

26

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria [hereinafter ‘Global Fund’] was
created to increase resources to fight three of the world’s most devastating diseases. It is
partnership between government, civil society, the private sector and affected communities
and operates on a set of principles such as
a.

Operate as financial instrument, not an implementing entity

b.

Make available and leverage additional financial resources

c.

Support programs that reflect national ownership

d.

Pursue an integrated and balanced approach to prevention and treatment

available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/how/.
27

See, Testimony of the US Senate Committee on Health Education, Labor and Pensions,
June 13, 2000 (statement of Patricia Danzen), available at http://www.senate.gov/~labor/
hearings. The assertion of Patricia Danzon and the pharmaceutical industry association has
been questioned by a number of scholars such as Deborah Socolar and Alan Sager (Deborah
Socolar & Alan Sager, Pharmaceutical Marketing and Research Spending: The Evidence
Does Not Support PhRMA’s claims, (Oct 21, 2001) available at http://dosc2.bumc.bu.edu/
hs/ushealthreform.htm. Socolar and Sager, after analysing the annual reports of these firms
concluded that 16 percent of the six major pharmaceutical firms had been taken as profit
and 31 percent went for marketing and administration which was nearly three times as
much as their R&D spending. Similar findings were noted by - Kaiser Foundation (Kaiser
Family Foundation, Prescription Drug Trends: A Chartbook, 65 Figures 4.5 and 4.6 (July
2000), at http://www.kff.org/content/2000/3019/PharmFinal.pdf); Families USA, Off the
Charts: Pay, Profits and Spending in Drug Companies, (July 10, 2001) available at http:/
/www.familiesusa.org/media/press/2001/drugceos.htm; Public Citizen’s Congress Watch,
Drug Industry Most Profitable Again, PUBLIC CITIZEN, (April 11, 2001) available at http://
www.citizen.org/congress/reform/drug_inidustry/profits/articles.cfm?ID=838. Also see T.
Lynn Riggs, Research and Development Costs for Drugs, 363 LANCET 184 (2004) (who argued
that 34% tax benefits should have been taken into account while calculating the R&D
expenditure). Also see Donald W. Light & Joel Lexchin, Will Lower Drug Prices Jeopardize
Drug Research? A Policy Fact Sheet, 4 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3 (2004).
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III. TRIPS AND THE PARAGRAPH 6 SOLUTION
A. History of the TRIPS Agreement
The Paris Convention28 and the Berne Convention29 dealing with the patenting
monopoly and copyright protection were controlled by the Bureaux Internationaux
Réunis pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle (BIRPI).30 The original treaties
provided for little more than national treatment among signatory countries, and a
major part of the present developing world was not involved at all. The USA accepted
the Berne Convention only in 1989, more than 100 years after it entered into force.31
From 1971 to 1986, the USA mostly entered into bilateral agreements with developing
countries introducing higher levels of industrial property monopoly.32 Some of the
provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)33 also had
intellectual property implications, namely Article IX(6) and Article XX(d). While
Article IX(6) dealt with the issues of trademarks and geographical indications, Article
XX(d) permitted contracting parties to “adopt or enforce measures necessary to secure
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions

28

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as revised at
Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 UST. 1630, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].

29

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised
at Paris on July 24, 1971, 25 UST. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].

30

World Intellectual Property Organisation, The First Twenty five Years of the World
Intellectual Property Organisation, from 1967 to 1992 at 31-40 (1992).

31

See Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late than Never: Implementation of the 1886 Berne Convention,
22 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 171, 180-81 (1989).

32

Bilateral agreements the USA entered into with Nicaragua and Sri Lanka are some of the
examples. Agreement on the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
Sept 20, 1991, US- Sri Lanka available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/agreements/
srilanka-1991-ip.html.
Agreement Concerning Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 1998, US–Nicar. available
at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/agreements/nicargua-1998-ip.html. Abbott, supra
note 5, at 711 n 71 (Abbott has described a number of bilateral strategies the USA resorted
to, to achieve enhanced intellectual property protection).

33

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 24 UST. 146, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT]. This agreement was supposed to be the part of the Havana Treaty
establishing the International Trade Organisation (the ITO) but US Congress did not permit
the USA to accede to this treaty. It was replaced in 1995 by the GATT 1994.
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of this Agreement, including those relating to the protection of patents, trademarks,
copyrights and prevention of deceptive practices.”34
At the Uruguay Round Negotiations, TRIPS was introduced without much clarity
as to its raison d’être, as the Ministerial Declaration at Punta del Este only stated
the need to “…clarify provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and
disciplines” with an aim to “…develop a multilateral frame work of principles,
rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods, taking
into account work already undertaken in GATT.”35 However, in 1990, the EC,36 the
USA,37 Japan,38 and Switzerland39 tabled exceptionally far-reaching proposals on
similar lines to the GATT Negotiating Group dealing with intellectual property. These
proposals contained detailed rules on the application of intellectual property, including
its interpretations before national courts, and the draft legal texts also contained
proposals for the application of the dispute-settlement system which was to be

34

Article XX(d) of GATT 1947 as incorporated in GATT 1994 reads as follows:
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption of enforcement by any contracting
party of measures:
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with
provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the
enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the
protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices.”

35

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Punta Del Este Declaration, (Sept. 20,
1986) available at http://www.sice.oad.org/trae/Punta_e.asp. See also Ministerial
Declaration of the Thirty-Eight Session at Ministerial Level, Nov. 29, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D.
(29th Supp.) 19 (1983) (this had discussed the issue of counterfeit goods); DANIEL GERVAIS,
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 11 (1998).

36

GATT. Draft Agreement on the TRIPS, Communication from the EC., GATT Doc. No.
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68, Mar. 29, 1990, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
TRIPS_e/ur_rft.exe.

37

GATT. Draft Agreement on the TRIPS, Communication from the United States, GATT Doc.
No. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70, May 11, 1990 available at http://www.wto.org/ english/
tratop_e/TRIPS_e/ur_rft.exe.

38

GATT. Draft Agreement on the TRIPS, Communication from Japan, GATT Doc. No.
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/74 dated May 15, 1990, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/TRIPS_e/ur_rft.exe.

39

GATT. Draft Agreement on the TRIPS, Communication from Switzerland, GATT Doc.No.
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/73 dated May 14, 1990, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/TRIPS_e/ur_rft.exe.

18

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

established at the end of the Uruguay Round. Developing countries also managed to
submit their draft legal texts,40 which were bundled together with the other draft
legal texts by Lars Anell, then Chairman of the TRIPS negotiating group.41 However,
practically all the proposals from developing countries were removed by Arthur
Dunkel, the then Director-General of the GATT and the Chairman of the Trade
Negotiating Committee, in collusion with Lars Anell.42 Braithwaite and Drahos have
discussed the role of mechanisms, principles and actors in the developments leading
to the TRIPS Agreement and observed that it was mainly coercion by the USA and a
very close cooperation between the USA, the EC and major Western firms which
led to the successful introduction of the TRIPS Agreement in the Uruguay Round.43
The TRIPS Agreement did not stabilise even after the establishment of the WTO,

40

GATT. Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India,
Nigeria,, Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay, GATT Doc. No. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71 May 14 1990
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/ur_rft.exe.

41

GATT, Chairman’s Report to the GNG: Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Doc. No. MTN.GNG/
NG11/W/76 July 23 1990.

42

The Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, GATT doc. No. MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev.1 Dec. 3, 1990. This still contained
developing countries’ points. See Daya Shanker, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, the Dispute Settlement System of the WTO and the Doha Declaration in the TRIPS
Agreement, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 721, 758. See also Paul Champs & Ameer Attaran, Patent
Rights and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the US-Brazil
Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 378-379. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS,
GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000) (“The considerable power of the Director General is
symbiotically linked to the power of the US and EC. One senior US Trade Official pointed
out , for example, in the later stages of the Uruguay Round the Director General (Sutherland)
‘conspiring with us’ made it almost impossible to change texts.”).

43

See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION, 73 (2000); See DUNCAN
N. MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2002); S.K.
SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: THE NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST
138 (1998); M. P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF
I NTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY , 100 (1998); R.Weissmann, A Long Strange TRIPS: The
Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonise Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the
Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECO. L. 1069, 1084 (1996).
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with constantly-changing interpretations of its provisions by the USA44 or the EC,
and conveniently-generated disputes such as Canada Patent Protection.45

B. The Paragraph 6 Solution of August 30, 2003
The Paragraph 6 Solution of August 30, 2003 has its genesis in a proposal
submitted by developing countries requesting an authoritative interpretation of Article
30 of the TRIPS Agreement to permit manufacture and export of patented medicines
by third parties to countries lacking the capacity to manufacture such products.46 No
decision was taken on this proposal, as it was postponed under paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on Public Health. Subsequently, the developing countries’ proposal
of a solution to this problem based on Article 30 of TRIPS was totally removed by the
TRIPS Council Chairman, Eduardo Perez Motta, and an Article 31-centric solution
based on a combination of the US and EC proposals was adopted on August 30, 2003
by the General Council, which was not rightfully authorised to take such a decision.

44

See Daya Shanker, Brazil, the Pharmaceutical Industry and the WTO, 5 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 51 (2002). Daya Shanker has discussed the complaint filed by the United States against
Brazil against the presence of the local working requirements in the Brazilian Patent Act.
Argentina also appears to have been coerced into changing its compulsory licensing
provisions amending the use of competition policy to deal with the abuses of the TRIPS
Agreement. See also Daya Shanker, Argentina-US Mutually Agreed Solution, Economic
Crisis in Argentina and Failure of the WTO Dispute Settlement System 44 IDEA 565 (2004).

45

Canada Patent Protection, supra note 6, is a unique dispute where both parties tried to
remove local working from the patent acts of Members of the WTO by insisting that Article
27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement would be applicable to Articles 31 and 30 exceptions. The
irony of the dispute becomes clear when one recognises that the German Supreme Court on
the basis of the Community Patent Convention had decided that the experimental use
exemption would be applicable to the generation of data to be submitted to the regulatory
authorities in Klinishe I and Klinische II. This aspect has been discussed in Daya Shanker,
Experimental Use Exceptions and Australian Patent Act: Submission to Advisory Council
on Intellectual Property, available at http://www.acip.gov.au/expusesubs.htm. See also
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 42, at 87, and Duncan Matthews, Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights: Will the Uruguay Round Consensus Hold? CSGR Working
Paper NO. 99/02, 20 (2002) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=319545/.

46

TRIPS, Council Discussion on Access to Medicines – Developing Country Group’s Paper,
IP/C/W/296, June 20, 2001, (submitted by a group of developing countries to the TRIPS
Council, for the special discussion on intellectual property and Access to Medicines, TRIPS
and Public Health: Submission by the Africa group, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines,
Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela.).
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The result is that it has now become virtually impossible for needy countries to access
the requisite medicines.47
In the Paragraph 6 Solution, the General Council has waived the obligations set
out in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement with respect to
pharmaceutical products, prescribing specific conditions for exporting and importing
countries. The exporting country can export such drugs only when it has made a
notification to the Council for TRIPS:
a. specifying the names and expected quantities of the product(s) needed;
b. confirming that the importing Member does not have the manufacturing
capacity or has insufficient manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical
sector for the product(s), and;
c. confirming that a compulsory licence has been issued in its territory under
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.
The compulsory licence by the exporting Member, apart from the conditions
mentioned in Article 31, must contain additional conditions that only the amount
necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing Member(s) may be manufactured
under the licence, and the entirety of this production must be exported to the
Member(s) which has notified its needs to the Council for TRIPS. The products

47

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (Apr. 15, 1994), Annex
1C1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/04-wto_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. Art. IV(2) states “There shall be a
General Council composed of representatives of all the Members, which shall meet as
appropriate. In the intervals between meetings of the Ministerial Conference, its functions
shall be conducted by the General Council. The General Council shall also carry out the
functions assigned to it by this Agreement…”.
Art. IV(1) of the Marrakesh Agreement deals with the authority of the Ministerial Conference.
It says “… [T]he Ministerial Conference shall carry out the functions of the WTO and take
actions necessary to this effect. The Ministerial Conference shall have the authority to take
decisions on all matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, if so requested by
a Member, in accordance with the specific requirements for decision making in this
Agreement and in the relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement.”
Art. IX(3) of the Marrakesh Agreement states “In exceptional circumstances, the Ministerial
Conference may decide to waive an obligation imposed on a Member of this Agreement or
any of eth Multilateral Trade Agreements, provided that any such decision shall be taken by
three fourths of the members unless otherwise provided for in this paragraph.”
Art. IX(4) of the Marrakesh Agreement discusses the procedures the Ministerial Conference
has to follow while granting a waiver and that such waiver is to be reviewed by the Ministerial
Conference within one year to verify the existence of such exceptional circumstances.
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produced under the licence must be clearly identified as being produced under the
system set out in this Decision through specific labelling or marking. Suppliers should
distinguish such products through special packaging and/or special colourings or
shaping of the products themselves, provided that such distinction is feasible and
does not have a significant impact on price. It must be clarified here that the supplier
is not the patent holder, as there would not be any need to issue a compulsory licence
for export purposes in such cases. A similar provision, i.e., that the patented products
should be clearly identified, has been added in the EC for export of medicines by the
patent holders to poor developing countries to prevent any diversion of such
products.48
All of the above would have to be done specifically under the guidance of the
TRIPS Council, which would have to be informed of “the name and address of the
licensee, the product(s) for which the license has been granted, the quantity(ies) for
which it has been granted, the country(ies) the product(s) is (are) to be supplied to
and the duration of the licence.” Paragraph 3 of the Paragraph 6 Solution, which
deals with remuneration, says that the supplier from the exporting countries (generic
manufacturers) must pay remuneration to the patent holder whereas the receiver is
waived from such payment. As we will see later on, none of the above provisions
formed a part of any developing country’s proposal, nor are they TRIPS-compatible.
There is no requirement of payment of remuneration in the importing member
countries if the goods are not manufactured in those countries by the patent-holder,
in violation of ‘local working’ requirements. Such compulsory licensing would be
covered by Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention, which does not provide for any
remuneration for abuse of the patent. Similarly, if the manufacture and export of the
patented product does not affect the commercial interest of the patent-holder in the
territory of the patent (i.e. the geographic area of the country), the question of any
payment of remuneration to the patent holder does not arise.49
The marginalisation of developing countries was consolidated by the General
Council Chairperson’s Statement accompanying the Decision of August 30, 2003
sharing the “…understandings of Members regarding the Decision to be taken and
the way in which it would be interpreted and implemented” and “to provide comfort
48

EC, Trade and Development: Access to Medicines, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
trade/csc/med08qa_en.htm (“q.4. Is there any link between this regulation and the Trade
related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) discussions on enabling developing
countries to use of compulsory licences to manufacture the drugs they need? In principle,
no. The discussion on compulsory licensing at the WTO TRIPS Council is a separate exercise.
However, in practice it’s clear that if poorer countries get the medicines they need under
tiered pricing arrangement, they won’t need to use compulsory licences.”).

49

See Daya Shanker, The Paragraph 6 Solution of the Doha Public Health Declaration and
Export Under the TRIPS Agreement, 7 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 365 (2004).
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to those who feared that the decision might be abused and undermine patent
protection.”50 The Chairman’s statement attached the “Best Practices” guidelines
apparently prepared by the pharmaceutical multinationals for members to follow. It
also provided the names of the members who opted out of using the system as
importers.51 The vacuity of the above solution becomes clear when one realises that
not one country has been able to avail of the intended benefit under the Decision of
August 30, 2003. In fact, Canada, while trying to amend its patent legislation to permit
manufacture and export of patented products, insisted on giving the option to the
patent-holder to take over the export of the products after the completion of
negotiations between generic manufacturers and the importing countries.52

C. The Paragraph 6 Solution of the Doha Declaration
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 53 was
essentially an outcome of developing countries’ proposals to affirm the concept of
the basic international customary law in international treaty interpretations to ensure
availability of medicines to their citizens because of the distortion introduced by the
WTO Panel Report in Canada Patent Protection saying that the objectives and purpose
are not to be taken into account while interpreting provisions of TRIPS.54 However,

50

The Chairperson’s Statement, supra note 7. See African Group’s recent proposals, supra
note 9, where they have questioned the legality of the Chairman’s Statement and why it was
linked at all in the August 30, 2003 Decision. It is still a controversy whether the Chairman’s
Statement would form part of December 6, 2005 Amendment.

51

These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States
of America.

52

However, in an editorial in Canadian Medical Association Journal, the editor discussed the
limitation of the Canadian legislation. See Editorial, Patently necessary: improving global
access to essential medicines, 169 CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL 1257, (December
9, 2003) available at http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/content/full/169/12/1257?etoc.

53

Doha Declaration, supra note 8.

54

Developing countries submitted two proposals to the Council for Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights. The first one was submitted on 20th June 2001 (IP/C/W/296)
followed by the second one which was submitted on 4th October 2001 (IP/C/W/312). Both
the proposals contained paragraphs related to interpretations of the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement, flexibility in issuing compulsory licensing and use of Article 30 to export
medicines to countries not having sufficient capacity to manufacture required medicines.
In Canada Patent Protection, the Panel led by Professor Robert Hudec agreed with the EC’s
argument that the objectives and purpose mentioned in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement are not relevant in interpretation of other provisions such as Articles 30 and 31
of the TRIPS Agreement which led to a narrowing of flexibility present in the TRIPS
Agreement.
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Paragraph 10 of the Draft Ministerial Declaration from a group of developing
countries55, which states that each member shall refrain from imposing sanctions or
threatening to impose sanctions against developing countries which avail themselves
of policy options to promote and protect public health, suggests that the present
economic and power structure have deteriorated considerably against developing
countries.56 This proposal was not accepted in the Doha Declaration on Public Health.
The only thing that developing countries gained at Doha was an affirmation that,
when applying the customary rule of interpretation to the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement, it should be done in the light of the object and purpose of the TRIPS
Agreement,57 a fundamental tenet in international treaty interpretation as mentioned
in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention and in various decisions of the Appellate Body.58
This was necessary because the Panel Report in Canada Patent Protection59 had
accepted the argument of irrelevance of the object and purpose in interpretations of
the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.60 However, as stated earlier, the most
important issue affecting the majority of the world’s population was the matter of
access to medicines in countries without manufacturing capacity or with insufficient
manufacturing capacity, because such countries have to depend on other countries
for the supply of medicines at accessible prices. The developing countries requested
in their October 4, 2001 proposal that a compulsory licence issued by a member to
supply medicines should be allowed to be given effect by another member under Article
30 of TRIPS (general exceptions).61

55

TRIPS: Proposal-Draft Ministerial Declaration, supra note 10.

56

Id. 10.

57

TRIPS: Council Discussion on Access to Medicines, supra note 46, 17. “Each provision of
the TRIPS Agreement should be read in light of the objectives and principles set forth in
Articles 7 and 8. Such an interpretation finds support in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (concluded in Vienna in 23 May 1969), which established, in Article 31, that ‘[a]
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose…’”,
available at, http://www.wto.org/english/tra_top_e/TRIPS_e/mindecdraft.htm. The Doha
Declaration in paragraph 5(a) says “[I]n applying the customary rules of interpretations of
public international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of
the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and
principles.”

58

See Shanker, supra note 44.

59

See Canada Patent Protection, supra note 6, 7.92.

60

See id. (“ . . . to the extent that prohibition of discrimination does limit the ability to target
certain products in dealing with certain important national policies referred to in Articles 7
and 8.1, the fact may well constitute a deliberate limitation rather than a frustration of
purpose”). Also see Shanker, supra note 42, at 738-39 and 742.

61

See Developing Countries’ Proposal Oct. 4, 2001, supra note 10.
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The most crucial outcome of the Doha Declaration – that TRIPS should be
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ “right to
protect public health, and in particular, to promote access to the medicines for all”62
– was not actually agreed to in the Decision of August 30, 2003. While recognising
that a “WTO Member with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement”,63 the developed countries, particularly the
USA, did not agree to the proposal regarding Article 30 as mentioned in paragraphs
5 and 9 of the Draft Declaration.64 However, under paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration, the Council for TRIPS was instructed to find an expeditious solution to
this problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.65

D. Non-Local Working and Compulsory Licensing
The concept of non-local working is applied to a situation where a patent-holder,
after obtaining the patent, does not start manufacturing the patented goods in the
territory of the patent. Although, on the basis of Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement,
the USA has tried to push the interpretation that working a patent can be accomplished
by importing the said patented product, this interpretation runs contrary to Article
5(A) of the Paris Convention, which deals with the issue of compulsory licences and
forfeiture of patents.
The major issue raised by incapacity or insufficient capacity to manufacture the
patented product is that, after obtaining a patenting monopoly, a patent-holder would
not start manufacture of the patented product in the territory of the patent. The
resulting non-manufacturing or non-local working is regarded as an abuse of the
patenting monopoly under Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention66 as incorporated in
TRIPS in Article 2.1, and permits such countries to issue compulsory licensing to
third partiers to manufacture or import such patented products without payment of
any remuneration. There is no provision for remuneration under Article 5(A) of the

62

Doha Declaration, supra note 8, 4.

63

Id. 6.

64

See Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Second Communication
from the United States, IP/C/W/358, July 9, 2002, 6 [hereinafter ‘US Second
Communication’].

65

Doha Declaration, 6 states “[W]e recognise that WTO members with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council
for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the general council.”

66

See Paris Convention, supra note 28.
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Paris Convention in cases where a compulsory licence is granted to third parties such
as generic manufacturers because the patent-holder did not start manufacturing the
patented product. The issue of compulsory licences for public order or public policy
or other reasons is covered by other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.67 It is clear
that Articles 30 and 31 deal with different situations, and not with the abuse of a
patent through non-local working or insufficient working. This interpretation has
been followed by the House of Lords in Parke Davis v. Comptroller of Patents68 and
by the German Supreme Court in Zwangslizenz.69
The requirement of local working of the patent cannot be satisfied by importing
the patented product. This has been clarified by Bodenhausen, former Director of
the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), and by a large number of
judicial decisions.70 Article 27.1 would not be applicable in the case of compulsory
licences issued for non-local working, as Article 2.2 of the TRIPS Agreement

67

See generally Daya Shanker, India, the Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of TRIPS,
5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 315 (2002); See also Paul Champs and Ameer Attaran, Patent Rights
and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the US-Brazil Patent
Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 378-379; E. Richard Gold and David K. Lam, Balancing
Trade in Patents-Public Non-Commercial Use and Compulsory Licensing, 6 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 5 (2003). A number of judgements have clarified the point that the abuse under Art.
5(A) is limited to local working and insufficient working and would not be covered by
provisions of compulsory licensing under public policy such as for food or medicines issued
under public policy. See Parke Davis v. Comptroller-General of Patents [1971] RPC 425,
[1970] FSR 443 and Zwangslizenz, GRUR 1996, 190. Other relevant judgments are Fette’s
Patent [1961] RPC 396; Re Cohmor Holdings, Chancery Division (Patents Court), (Transcript
Martin Walsh Cherer), Jan 27, 1997. Ss. 48, 49 and 50 of the un-amended UK Patent Act
1977 were intended to reduce the ‘abuse of monopoly’ by the patent holder. S. 50(1)(a) of the
un-amended UK Patent Act 1977 stated “…that an invention which can be worked on a
commercial scale in the United Kingdom and which should in the public interest be so worked
shall be worked here without undue delay and the fullest extent that is reasonably
practicable.”
Section 48(3) of the UK Patent Act till it was partially modified by The Patents and
Trademarks (World Trade Organisation) Regulations, 1999, provides for the issue of
compulsory licences. It said “Where the patented invention is capable of being commercially
worked in the United Kingdom, that it is not being so worked to the fullest extent that it is
reasonably practicable; Where the patented invention is a product, that a demand for the
product in the United Kingdom… is being met to a substantial extent by importation; Where
the patented invention is capable of being commercially worked in the United Kingdom,
that it is being prevented or hindered from being so worked.”

68

See Parke Davis v. Comptroller-General of Patents [1971] RPC 425, [1970] FSR 443.

69

Zwangslizenz, GRUR 1996, 190 [Supreme Court](G.D.R.).

70

See G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, (BIRPI, World Intellectual Property Organisation, Geneva, 1968).
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specifically prohibits any derogation from the provisions of the Paris Convention by
any provision of the TRIPS Agreement and it is a general principle of interpretation
that a general provision cannot be applied to a specific stipulation.71 In the case of
compulsory licensing for non-local working or insufficient working, there is no
provision for any remuneration, which explains the exceptional hostility of the USA
against local working, as revealed in its complaints against Brazil,72 which forced Brazil
to enter into a Mutually Agreed Solution for prior consultation with the United States.73
The local working provision is present in patent acts of practically all developing
countries including that of India. However, the threatening language used by the
United States Trade Representative (USTR), implying that countries which issue
compulsory licensing for non-local working would be aggressively pursued, have been
sufficient to deter developing countries from resorting to such compulsory licenses.

E. Enablement and Voidability of the Patent
The incapacity of a country to manufacture a patented product has a
corresponding issue of non-enablement. The concept of enablement while granting a
patent requires a clear and precise description of the patent and the manner of making
and using such patent for the patent to be valid. A patent is a limited monopoly given
to the innovator of the product on the express condition that he or she would provide
detailed and accurate information, using which a person familiar with the Art would
be able to replicate the product. If, because of the lack of technical qualifications and
other resources, it is not possible to duplicate the patented product, then the purpose
of granting a monopoly to promote social welfare through dissemination of
information would be defeated. The enablement of a patent is one of the most
important obligations of a patent-holder, wherein the temporary monopoly is granted
on the grounds that the patent can be enabled in the territory of the patent.74 Two

71

See Daya Shanker, Brazil, the Pharmaceutical Industry and the WTO, 5 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 51, 62-64.

72

See id.

73

See World Trade Organisation, Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent Protection, Notification of
Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.1, July 19, 2001.

74

93 F2d 94 (1937, CA III), cert. den. 304 US 570 (1938), 82 L Ed 1535, 58 S Ct 1039, reh den
(1938) 304 US 590, 82 L Ed 1549, 58 S Ct 1054.
In National Carbon v. Western Shade Cloth Co. 304 US 570 (1938), the Court observed
“Specifications of patent including description and claims constituted contract between
public and patentee under which public, through government, agreed that in consideration
of inventor’s disclosure and grant of right to use same after his monopoly expired, he should
have been protected in his exclusive use during life of patent; the object was to place patent
fully within knowledge of public and defined actual creation which public had undertaken
to protect.”
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important considerations should thus be kept in mind during the patent grant process:
firstly, that the description of the patent should be so clear and precise that it is possible
for one in the art to replicate the patent, and, secondly, that in a situation where the
patent cannot be replicated because of lack of suitably qualified personnel and
infrastructure in the territory of the patent, granting of the patenting monopoly should
not arise. Enablement cannot be uniform across all countries and will differ depending
on each country’s human resources and industrial capacity. Where a patent cannot
be enabled it would be void, as interpreted in a number of judicial decisions in the
USA and UK.75 The US Supreme Court and other courts observed that, when foreign
patent specifications do not sufficiently describe essentials of the invention so that a
person skilled in the art cannot put it into practice, such prior art cannot invalidate
the patent.76 The specifications should be so clear that undue experimentation is not
required by one skilled in the art to which it appertains to enable him to compound
and use it.77 Sections 5(2)(b), 14.3 and 72.1(c) in the UK Patent Act, Article 83 of the
European Patent Convention (EPC), Article 5 in the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)

75

Recent decisions dealing with enablement in the US are Hazeltine Research v. Dage Electric
Co, 271 F.2d 218, 220 (7th Cir. 1959); Plant Genetic Systems v. Dekalb Genetics, 271 F.2d 218
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Genentech v. Novo Nordisk108 F. 3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting
In re: Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); Biotechnology General v. Genentech,
267 F. 3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Process Control Corporation v. Hydreclaim 190 F. 3d 1350
(Fed. Cir. 1999); University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle, 249 F. Supp. 2d 216 (W.D.N.Y.
2003) aff’d 358 F.3d 916, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (The Federal Circuit reiterated its observation
in Union Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F. 3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000) that ordinarily
skilled artisans would have been able to identify any compound based on its vague functional
description as “a non-steroidal compound that selectively inhibits activity of the PGHS-2
gene product.”); Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, 152 F. 3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Durel Corporation v. Osram Sylvania, 256 F.3d 1298, 1306-1307 (Fed.Cir. 2001); Enzo
Biochem v. Calgene 188 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999), 52 USP.Q.(BNA) at 1134; In re:
Vaek, 947 F. 2d 488, 495-96 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re: Fisher, 57 C.C.P.A. 1099 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(The Federal Circuit reiterated the factors to be taken into consideration while determining
enablement. These are: (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the
nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art,
(7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.).

76

Cawood Patent 94 US 695 (1877), 24 L Ed 238; Carson v. American Smelting & Refining Co.
4 F2d 463 (1925, CA9 Washington), cert den 269 US 555 (1925), 70 L Ed 441, 57 S Ct 18;
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation v. George A. Breon & Co. (1936, CAB Mo) 85 F2d
166, cert den 299 US 598 (1936), 81 L Ed 441, 57 S Ct 191; Le Roy v Tatham 55 US 156
(1853), 14 How 156, 14 L Ed 367.

77

Wood v. Underhill 46 US 1 (1846), 5 How 1, 12 L Ed 223; Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford
214 US 366 (1909), 53 L Ed 1034, 29 S Ct 652; United States Industrial Chemical Co. v.
Theroz Co. (1928, CA4 Md) 25 F2d 387, cert. den (1928) 278 US 608, 73 L Ed 534, 49 S Ct 12
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and section 27(3) of the Canadian Patent Act have similar enablement provisions.78
The concept of enablement can be clearly understood by an analysis of various judicial
decisions dealing with § 112 in the US Patent Act.
In Johns Hopkins, the Federal Circuit discussed the District Court’s observation
that “testimony at trial established that a person skilled in the art of making
monoclonal antibodies must have a bachelor’s degree in the appropriate scientific
field and must have made a monoclonal antibody at least once with approval.”79 The
reasoning used was that the requirements for enablement were based on the notion
that the purpose of granting a patent is to grant a limited monopoly to encourage the
further progress of science and art and thus, if a particular product could not be
manufactured by a lack of description, wherewithal, equipment, or personnel, it would
not be patentable as the whole purpose of patenting it would be defeated. In a
developing country, therefore, enablement of a patent of high complexity would be
harder than in a technologically advanced country such as the USA. The description
of a patent leading to enablement in such situation would be different and, in those
countries where the products cannot be manufactured or replicated, patenting rights
for such products cannot be granted. The importing of a patented product would not
satisfy enablement criteria for granting a patent.80 In the UK, the disclosure has been
regarded as that of the highest degree of good faith for being granted a monopoly and
it is required to be clear, precise, honest and open.81 In Biogen v. Medeva,82 the
78

S. 14. 3 of the UK Patent Act says that “[t]he specification of an application shall disclose the
invention in a manner which is clear enough and complete enough for the invention to be
performed by a person skilled in the art.”S. 72(1) of the UK Patent Act provides that the
absence of enabling disclosure as one of the grounds for the revocation of patent, the
paragraph (c) of which states the treason for revocation of a patent when “the specification
of the patent does not disclose the invention clearly enough and completely enough for it to
be performed by a person skilled in the art.”
The Canadian Patent Act 27(3) requires the inventor to set forth clearly the steps required
to make the “composition of matter, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art or science to which it pertains, or with which it is most closely
connected, to make it.”

79

See Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, 152 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

80

35 USC. § 112 of the US Patent Act provides that “[t]he specification shall contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”

81

British Ore Concentration Syndicate Ltd. v. Minerals Separation Ltd., 27 R.P.C. 47 (1907);
Cincinnati Grinders (Inc.) v. BSA Tools Ltd., 48 R.P.C. 33 (1931); Biogen v. Medeva [1997]
R.P.C. 1.

82

Biogen v. Medeva [1997] R.P.C. 1.
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question of enablement was discussed by the House of Lords, which held that for the
purposes of Sections 14(3) and 72(1)(c), the disclosure must be sufficient to enable
the whole width of the invention to be performed. Where the specifications are
regarded as addressed to a group of persons with different capabilities, such group of
persons is assumed to cooperate for the purpose in view.83 In Mentor Corporation v.
Hollister Inc., the Court observed that the hypothetical addressee had to be prepared
to display a reasonable degree of skill and common knowledge of art in making trials
and to correct obvious errors.84
Hence, the TRIPS Agreement covers the issue of exports to countries with no
capacity or insufficient capacity to manufacture completely and does not need any
addition or subtraction as suggested by the EC, the USA, Japan, Canada and
Switzerland for this purpose. The incapacity to manufacture a patented product brings
out the relationship between enablement and local working. The concept of local
working thus continues to be present in the Paris Convention and has been
incorporated into TRIPS.

IV. THE POSITION OF ARTICLES 30 AND 31 OF TRIPS IN
THE PARAGRAPH 6 SOLUTION
A. Paragraph 6 at Doha and Proposals from WTO Members
As mentioned earlier, the developing countries’ proposal at Doha for an
authoritative interpretation of Article 30 of TRIPS regarding the manufacture and
export of required medicines to needy countries was not finalised, and participants
were pushing for either alternative proposals or non-proposals at the negotiations.
The TRIPS Council received a number of proposals about Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration. By June 2002 the proposals were compiled together in document IP/C/
W/363 dated 11th July 2002.85

1. Proposal from the European Community
The EC first asserted that current WTO legislation did not cater to situations in
which a nation which issues a compulsory license does not have the capacity to
83

Valensi v. British Radio Corporation [1973] R.P.C. 377; Osram Lamp Works v. Pope’s Electric
Lamp Co. Ltd. 34 R.P.C. 369, 391 (1917).

84

Mentor Corporation v. Hollister Inc. [1973] RPC 7.

85

World Trade Organisation, Proposals on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health: Thematic Compilation, IP/C/W/363 dated 11 July 2002
[hereinafter Thematic Compilation].
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manufacture the said product.86 The two options suggested by the EC to deal with
such situations were:
a. an amendment to Article 31(f) so that the medicines can be produced elsewhere
under compulsory licenses and exported to the country in need; or
b. an interpretation of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement to allow medicines to
be produced elsewhere for export to the country in need.
The EC also introduced the issues of diversion of the medicines manufactured
for export to needy countries to other countries and transparency in such transactions
“in order to allow other Members to be informed if a Member makes use of this
mechanism”.87
However, the most significant part of the EC’s proposal concerned the use of
Article 30 to manufacture and export medicines to needy WTO members. The EC
without reservation proposed: “WTO members could adopt a declaration stating that
a WTO Member may, in accordance with Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, provide
that the manufacture, on its territory, of a patented product, without the authorisation
of the right holder, is lawful when it is meant to supply another country which has
granted a compulsory licence for the import and sale of the product concerned in its
territory in order to deal with a serious public health problem.”88 The EC reiterated
its Article 30 solution in the subsequent document also.89

86

EU Tables Proposals on Access to Medicines for Developing Countries with No Drug
Production, Press Release, Brussels, (Mar. 5, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/trade/csc/pr_050302.htm and Concept Paper Relating to Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Communication from the European
Community and its Member States, IP/C/W/339, Council for Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, WTO (Mar. 4, 2002) [hereinafter EC’s Concept Paper].
Subsequently on 20th June 2002, the EC submitted another Communication (IP/C/W/352)
adding two more solutions based on the US Communication. These additional potential
solutions were
a. a dispute settlement moratorium with regard to the non-respect of the restriction
under a compulsory licence, and
b. a waiver with regard to Article 31(f).

87

See id., EC’s Concept Paper 16, 20.

88

See id. at 24.

89

World Trade Organisation, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration of the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health (Communication from the European Communities and their member
States to the TRIPS Council), IP/C/W/352 dated 20th June 2002, WTO [hereinafter EC’s
Para 6 Proposal].
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2. Proposals from the United States
The US proposal was in line with that of the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers Association (PhRMA), a lobby group of the US pharmaceutical
industry, when it stated in paragraph 7 of its Second Communication: “A TRIPSbased solution can also only be expected to be effective where Members have, or are
provided, the resources necessary to procure pharmaceuticals under the terms of a
TRIPS-consistent compulsory license, which includes the provision of adequate
remuneration to the patent holder.”90
In paragraph 8 of the US Second Communication, the question of import from
other countries was introduced. While the USA stated the obvious by saying that
there was nothing to prevent import under compulsory licenses from other countries,
it also stated that “a compulsory license would also need to be issued in that country
before medicines could be exported.”91 There is, in fact, no provision either in Article
28 or any other article of TRIPS to support this.92
The right to exclude exports has never been granted to the patent-holder either
by the TRIPS Agreement or through national patent acts. Except in Section 2567 of
the PVPA93 and § 271(f) of the US Patent Act,94 a patenting monopoly has never been
extended to export.95 The patenting monopoly on “making” and “offering for sale”

90

See US Second Communication, supra note 66, at 7.

91

See id. at 8.

92

See generally Daya Shanker, Para 6 Solution of the Doha Declaration, Article 30 of TRIPS
and Non-Prohibition of Exports under the TRIPS Agreement, Working Paper, University
of Wollongong, published in SSRN Working Paper Series, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=377160.

93

See The Plant Variety Protection Act (1970) (PVPA) where the patenting monopoly has
specifically been extended to export and from 35 USC. § 271(f). The PVPA reads as follows:
“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, it shall be an infringement of the rights of
the owner of a novel variety to perform without authority, any of the following acts in the
United States, or in commerce which can be regulated by Congress or affecting such
commerce, prior to expiration of the right to plant variety protection but after either the
issue of the certificate or the distribution of a novel plant variety with the notice under
section 2567 of this title:
“(1) sell the novel variety, or offer it or expose it for sale, deliver it, ship it, consign it, exchange
it, or solicit an offer to buy it, or any other transfer of title or possession of it;
“(2) import the novel variety into, or export it from, the United States;

94

35 USC. § 271(f) (1994).

95

35 USC. § 271(f) was introduced in the US Patent Act, 12 years after the judgement of the US
Supreme Court in Deepsouth Packing to overrule its observation that patenting monopoly
did not extend to the individual constituents of the assembled machine of invention.
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would not affect export of the patented product or process, given the decisions of the
US,96 Canadian,97 UK98 and Japanese courts.99 National patent acts generally only
exclude those types of “making” which affect the commercial exploitation of the patent
in the territory of the patent. In a number of judicial decisions in the USA100 and in
the WTO Panel decision in Canada Patent Protection,101 it was confirmed that the
making of a patented product even in an unlimited amount would not violate the
patenting provision if such making does not lead to the commercial exploitation of

96

See Sawin v. Guild, 1 Robb, Pat. Case 47, Fed. Cas. No. 12391, 21 F. Cas. 554 (Cir. Ct D. Mass.
1813); Bonsack Machine v. Underwood 73 F. 206 (Cir. Ct. E. D. N. Car. 1896); Brown v.
Duchesne 60 US 183 (1856); Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc. 55 F. Supp. 223, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1944)
affirmed 156 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1946); Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals 572 F.
Supp. 255, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev. Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals 733 F.2d 858
(Fed. Cir. 1084) which in turn was reversed by US Congress by introducing § 271(e) in the
US Patent Act; Aakro Agate v. Master Marble Co. v. Master Marble Co. 18 F. Supp. 305
(N.D.W. Va. 1937); Kaz Manufacturing Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s Inc., 211 F. Supp. 815
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff’d. 317 F. 2d 679 (2d Circuit, 1963); Quality Tubing v. Precision Tube
Holdings 75 F. Supp. 2d 613, 623 (S. D. Tex. 1999); Rotec Industries v. Mitsubishi 215 F. 3d
1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Cybotronics v. Golden Source Elecs. 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1167-73
(C.DE. Cal. 2001), WL 327826.

97

Microchem v. SmithKline & French, [1972] S.C.R. 506.

98

Frearsaono v. Loe, (1878), 9 Ch. D. 48.

99

See Ono Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Kyoto Pharmaceutical Industries, Case No. 1998 (ju) 153
(Apr. 16, 1999) (decided by the Supreme Court of Japan).

100

See Intermedics v. Ventritex, 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N. D. Cal. 1991), aff’d, 991 F. 2d 808
(Fed. Cir. 1993)(non-presidential decision) (“We infer that the phrase ‘reasonably related’
(to development information for the FDA) as used in § 271(e)(1) reflects Congress’s
acknowledgement that it will not always be clear to parties setting out to seek FDA approval
for their new product exactly which kinds of information, and in what quantities, it will
make to win that agency’s approval.” The question of quantity was discussed in the context
that the defendant had manufactured several hundred Cadences); In Amgen (Amgen v.
Hoechst Marion Roussel, 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D. Mass. 1998) aff’d by Amgen v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel 314 F. 3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) the court discussed the question of
commercial production of patented products by a generic manufacturer before the expiry of
the patent. The argument was based on Amgen’s assertion that Hoechst had planned a total
of five batches of commercial scale production of GA-EPO as required by the Japanese and
the European regulatory agencies and had produced at least three commercial scale
productions apart from batch 07. The court in Amgen observed that Hoechst was protected
by § 271(e)(1) if the production of three batches of GA-EPO was objectively likely to generate
useful information, even if the results were discarded for reasons unrelated to FDA approval.
The court specifically observed that retention of the GA-EPO manufactured is not an activity
that could constitute infringement under § 271(a) as was observed in Telectronics
(Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex Inc., 982 F. 2d 1520, 1523-24, 25 USPQ2D 1196,
1199 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

101

See Canada Patent Protection, supra note 6, 7.45.
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the patent in the territory of the patent. The assertion of the USA that a compulsory
licence would also need to be issued in that country for the export of medicines to be
possible is, thus, not based on any valid legal interpretation.
In paragraph 12 of its Second Communication, 102 the USA insisted on
identification of the countries not having manufacturing capacity or insufficient
capacity on the basis of certain criteria followed by its proposal to limit the countries
willing to export only to the members of developing and least developed countries.103
The proposal pertaining to transfer of technology under Article 31(f) by the group of
African countries was probably discussed in this context.104 The USA introduced the
concept of “transparency” in part V, paragraph 20 of its Second Communication
requiring developing countries and least developed countries to inform the TRIPS
Council of actions taken under the proposed mechanism where Article 31(f) is used
to export the patented product to fulfil the requirement of other countries, which will
apparently ensure that goods reach the needy countries under the policing of the
TRIPS Council.
The most disturbing statement in the United States’ proposal pertains to Article
30 of the TRIPS Agreement, wherein the USA insisted that the use of Article 30 to
export a patented product would unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation of
the patent and prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner.”105 The US
argument appears to be specious, considering that the US permitted manufacturing
of the patented product in unlimited quantities for regulatory approval purposes under
the Bolar exception embodied in the US in the Hatch-Waxman Act, which was
confirmed as compatible with Article 30 exceptions in Canada Patent Protection.106
The reasoning behind this assertion from the USA appears to be based on a discussion
of Article 30 by Abbott.107 The US compounded its position by the inclusion of a onetime waiver along the lines of the Bolar exception, in line with PhRMA’s suggestions

102

See US Second Communication, supra note 66, 12.

103

See id., 15.

104

WTO, Proposal on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health: Joint Communication from the African Group in the WTO, IP/C/W/351 (June 24,
2002) received from the Permanent Mission of Kenya on behalf of the African Group in the
WTO [hereinafter African Proposal] at 6(e).
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See US Second Communication, supra note 66, 6.
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See Canada-Patent Protection, supra note 6.
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See Frederick M. Abbott, WTO TRIPS Agreement and Its Implications for Access to
Medicines in Developing Countries, Report commissioned by the CIPR as a background
paper, Study Paper 2a, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (Feb. 14, 2002) available
at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp2a_abbott_study.pdf.
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as enumerated by Amir Attaran.108 The USA also questioned the legality of the
authoritative interpretation of a WTO provision provided under Article IX (2) of the
Marrakesh Agreement,109 despite the fact that this assertion goes against the United
States’ own argument in the Alcoholic Beverages case110 and against the decision of
the Appellate Body111 (discussed in detail later in this chapter). The USA is not only
trying to undermine the flexibility inherent in the TRIPS Agreement as partly retrieved
by developing countries in the Doha Declaration on Public Health, but also undermines
the Ministerial Conference which has been empowered in terms of Article IX: 1 of the
Marrakesh Declaration, to authoritatively interpret the provisions of these agreements.
The USA’s assertion does not appear to have legal support, as both the phrases
“unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of a patent” and “unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner” mentioned in Article 30 of
TRIPS are to be interpreted in terms of the direct economic and commercial effect on
the patent in the territory of the patent. When the patented products are exported
out of the patented areas, they are not affecting the interests of the patent-holder
reasonably or unreasonably at all in the territory of that patent. Even without Article
30, the US Supreme Court has delivered verdicts such as Deepsouth Packing v.
Laitram Corporation112 to the effect that patented products exported under knockeddown conditions do not violate the US Patent Act and that the patent holder does not
have the right to prohibit the export of the patented product.113

108

See Amir Attaran, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health: Options for TRIPS Council, Working paper No. 87, Center for International
Development, Harvard University (2002) at 8 available at http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/
cidwp/087.pdf. This paper was subsequently published in Fordham Intellectual Property,
Media and Entertainment Law Journal (Amir Attaran, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options Under WTO Law,
12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 869 (2002)) (Attaran suggested a
concept of non-justiciability which would exempt the manufacture and export of generic
versions of patented pharmaceuticals when these are intended for countries lacking
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.) Amir Attaran’s relations with the Harvard
University was a little controversial when it was found out that his salary during his stay in
the Harvard University was paid by an outside organisation, the Africa Fights Malaria,
essentially financed by a group of mining firms in South Africa interested in playing down
the extent of AIDS/HIV impacts.
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See US Second Communication, supra note 66, 29.
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WTO Report of the Appellate Body, Japan Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS58/AB/R,
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (4 th October, 1996) adopted 8 th November 1999
[hereinafter Japan Taxes].
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See Daya Shanker, supra note 42, 764-767.
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3. Proposals from Developing Countries and the UAE
The proposal from the developing countries was essentially a continuation of
their proposal in the Draft Declaration dated October 4, 2001114 and maintained that
the use of Article 30 should “recognise the right of WTO members to authorise third
parties to make, sell and export patented public health-related products without the
consent of the patent holder to address public health needs in another country.”115
Using Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, the developing countries discussed
two aspects of the issues raised by the insufficiency or incapacity of certain members
of the WTO to manufacture: the first was regarding “local working”,116 which was a
continuation of their argument put forth in June 2001,117 and the second was the
authoritative interpretation of Article 30 as set out above.118 There are two aspects to
the developing countries argument. The first aspect appears to be based on the
presumption that the patent rights granted cover the export of the patented products
to territories outside that of the patent, while the second aspect suggests that it is the
responsibility of the countries exporting and importing the patented products to
establish appropriate safeguards. In paragraphs 9 and 11 of their document, the
developing countries elaborated on the use of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement and
why it would not “unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent or
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner.”119 The United

114

TRIPS: Council Discussion on Access to Medicines, supra note 46.

115

See Paragraph 6 of the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
received from the Permanent Mission of Brazil, on behalf of the delegation of Bolivia, Brazil,
Cuba, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and
Venezuela, IP/C/W/355 (June 24, 2002), TRIPS Council [hereinafter Communication from
Developing Countries].
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Id. at 3 “The development of local manufacturing capacities for public health-related
products, whenever economically feasible, is critical to ensuring the development of
sustainable health policies and access to affordable medicines, particularly in developing
countries”.
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WTO, TRIPS and Public health – Submission by the African Group, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela, document IP/C/W/296
(June 20, 2001) at 20, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/
paper_develop_w296_e.htm
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See id. at 20.
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Communication from Developing Countries, supra note 119, 9;
Similarly 11 of the Communication from Developing Countries says
“Clearly, nothing in the letter and spirit of Article 30 of TRIPS prevents members from
authorising local producers to make, sell and export public health –related products, without
the consent of the patent holder, to address health needs in other countries with insufficient
or no manufacturing capacities, as a limited exception under this provision. In light of the
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Arab Emirates suggested an interpretation of Article 30 of TRIPS to “engage, sell and
export patented public health related products without the consent of the patent holder
to address public health needs in another country” and further suggested that the
interpretation should not “prejudice other exceptions to the exclusive rights initially
available to the members under Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement.”120 While
discussing a possible Article 31(f) solution, the developing countries proposed that
Article 31(f) should be eliminated altogether.
4. Proposal from the African Group
Perhaps due to their free trade negotiations with the USA, the African countries
preferred to file their own proposal separate from the other developing countries.121
Their proposal was concerned predominantly with the Common Market approach of
the African Nations, which they expanded in the paragraph 6(d) of their proposal.
This paragraph says:
Members, in respect of licences issued to address practices that restrain
trade, other abusive practices, and insufficiency of supplies of
pharmaceutical products, may recognise or give effect to the licences
at a regional level where a domestic market is part and parcel of a
regional market for instance under a free trade area or a custom union
or the interim arrangements.122
However, in paragraph 3(5) of this document, the African group recognised the
limitation of the Article 31(f) solution and suggested that it should be deleted or a
clear authoritative interpretation adopted.123 It also insisted on flexibility in the

mandate to find expeditious solutions to the problem recognised in Paragraph 6, an
authoritative interpretation of Article 30 confirming this legal solution would be an important
step to ensure legal certainty of all WTO Members. Moreover, in light of paragraph 4 of the
Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPAS Agreement and Public Health [Doha Declaration],
Article 30 of TRIPS ‘should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of
WTO member’s right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all’.”
120

See WTO, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration of the TRIPS Agreement and Public health,
Communication from the United Arab Emirates, IP/C/W/354 (June 24, 2002), 20-21.
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African Proposal, supra note 108.

122
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See id. at 6(d).
Id. at 3(e) “These limitations show how paragraph (f) of Article 31 may be far out of line with
the needs of members in the face of the international and national health crises upon us.
The paragraph needs to be deleted, or a clear exception introduced, or an authoritative
interpretation adopted, bearing in mind the said time frame within which an expeditious
solution should be adopted.”
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grounds for issuing of compulsory licenses.124 The approach of the African group seems
to have been to use the opportunity to push for the industrialisation of Africa, which
is supported by their subsequent statement in paragraph 6(e) asking for adoption of
measures to build a sound technological base in the developing countries of Africa so
as to facilitate the domestic production of pharmaceutical products to meet public
health needs.125
The most important point raised by the African group was the reiteration of a
“comprehensive moratorium on disputes against any Member that takes measures
to address the international and national health concerns in countries with insufficient
or no manufacturing capacity.”126 Another observation from the African group pertains
to the tendency seen in some bilateral and multilateral arrangements between
developed and developing countries, wherein developing countries have been asked
not only to give up not only the flexibility due to them under the TRIPS Agreement
but also to raise their levels of patenting monopoly.127 Such arrangements have been
made in the FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of America) treaty signed between the
USA and Chile and are part of the free trade agreements being negotiated between
the USA and the African countries such as South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia
and Swaziland, which are members of the South African Customs Union (SACU).128
The African group suggested that members “should avoid the fragmentation of the
multilateral regime on intellectual property rights provided by the TRIPS Agreement,
and should respect and ensure the use to the full flexibility in the TRIPS agreement.”129
Overall, the proposal from the African group was essentially complementary to the
proposals from the developing countries and the UAE without diluting them, and
additionally incorporates an important point on the transfer of technology.
5. The TRIPS Council and Thematic Compilation
On the basis of these proposals, the TRIPS Council prepared a thematic
compilation by the middle of July 2002.130 Coincidentally, Document MTN.GNG/
124

Id. at 3(f) “As the declaration points out, for instance, members have the right to determine
the grounds on which to issue compulsory licences and such grounds are not set out in the
TRIPS Agreement. This flexibility needs to be protected against attempt to restrictively define
the scope of the freedom of members to determine grounds for compulsory licences.”
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Id. at 6(I), 5.
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Id. at 6(g).
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See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, available at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/
eumed/middleasst/USJordanFTA.shtml.
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USTR, The letter sent by Ambassador Robert B. Zoellick to Sen. Byrd on or about 4th
November, 2002, www.ustr.gov.
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African Proposal, supra note 108, at 5.
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Thematic Compilation, supra note 89.
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NG11/W/76 dated July 23, 1990 was prepared in similar circumstances during the
TRIPS negotiations, where then-Chairman Anell put the proposals from different
countries together and similarly divided it in a number of sections depending upon
the origin of the proposals. Subsequently, each and every proposal from developing
countries was removed or circumscribed. The TRIPS Council divided the proposals
in its thematic compilation in two sections: one which included the elements
suggesting facilitation of exports to members with insufficient manufacturing
capacities (including proposals from the USA, the EC and developing countries) and
one which included proposals mainly from the African group, which discussed the
issues of technology transfer and establishment of manufacturing capacity along with
the expansion of a unified market.
All this indicated the shape of things to come. The USA suggested the waiver of
conditions in Article 31 of TRIPS as if the Article 30 solution did not exist, and made
the unethical observation that an authoritative interpretation would lead to more
litigation. The EC gave the Article 30 solution a chance to be adopted, but
recommended a thick web of conditions to block the so-called diversion of patented
products without providing any evidence of diversion.131 Outterson has discussed the
question of diversion in detail and he concludes that the question of diversion to
developed countries has never been an issue, since, throughout the period when
medicines and chemicals were exempted from patenting in developing countries,
there was no diversion of such medicines and chemicals to developed countries.
Outterson also points out that parallel trade – where the patented goods, once sold,
are supposed to go out of the control of the patent-holder under the first sale
exhaustion regime and can be freely imported and exported – did not lead to price
convergence, as is evident from the price divergence in the EC. The scare of diversion
was created by the monopolistic industries essentially to segregate the international
market into different segments to gain maximum revenue, without making any effort
to provide access to medicines to developing countries.
Another intriguing development at this stage was the African group’s choice to
separate itself from the other developing countries. There was a commonality of
purpose between the USA and the African group proposals regarding the need for
technology transfer and the extension of compulsory licensing to the regional
geographical area instead of confining it to a single country. The break-up of the
131

See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 193 (2004)
(discussing the scare of diversion of such medicines generated by the pharmaceutical industry
by giving example of the Dowelhurst case (Glaxo Group Ltd v. Dowelhurst Ltd [2004] All
E.R. (D) 126 (Mar) where the goods claimed to have been diverted to Europe by Glaxo never
left the EC.).
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developing country group also perhaps emboldened Edouardo Motta, the Chairman
of the TRIPS Council, resulting in the removal of the Article 30 solution completely
from his note. It perhaps further resulted in the prime proposal being a combination
of the American proposal of the waiver of the conditions of Article 31 solution and the
thick web of conditions recommended in the EC’s proposal, which in effect
incorporated exports as one of the patenting rights in Article 28 of the TRIPS
Agreement.

B. Paragraph 6 and the Introduction of Regulatory Provisions
The introduction of a series of regulatory provisions in the area of exports of
patented products for the ostensible reason of providing transparency does not appear
to be convincing, as provisions dealing with the exports of the patented products
were clearly present in the TRIPS Agreement under Articles 31 and 30132 and there
was a clear observation by the Panel in Canada Patent Protection that any question
of diversion of the patented product is the responsibility of the patent holder and not
that of national governments.133 Articles 31(f) and 31(k) do not have a corresponding
free import provision in the territories where a patent is in force, and the only way a
patented product can get through in these territories is through trade diversion. Article
31 implies that non-predominant parts of such manufactured goods can be disposed
of, and there is no account-maintenance system whereby the TRIPS Council is
informed of details such as the amount manufactured. Based on Article 31(k) of the
TRIPS Agreement, a large number of countries, including the UK and India, have
incorporated provisions in their patent laws saying that patented products
manufactured under Article 31(k) can be freely exported.
There is no provision in the TRIPS Agreement for putting into place an elaborate
control structure. From the developments so far, the purpose of constructing such a
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There are two provisions in Article 31 of TRIPS dealing with the manufacture and exports of
such manufactured products under compulsory licensing. These are:
1. Article 31(f), which the General Council attempted to amend although not empowered to
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any such use [of the products manufactured under Article 31 of TRIPS] shall be
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorising such
use; and
2. Article 31(k) which says:
Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in sub-paragraph (b) and
(f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or
administrative process to be anti-competitive.
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structure appears to be not only to frighten manufacturers or the countries concerned
but subsequently to extend it throughout all compulsory licensing systems. Chairman
Motta’s note and its confirmation as an authoritative interpretation by the General
Council of the WTO on August 30, 2003134 is a rewriting of the TRIPS Agreement
and, given the developments so far, it is evidently highly skewed towards the wishes
of the USA and the EC. There is nothing new in the export of patented products
produced under compulsory licensing, and there appears to be no requirement for
such an elaborate structure, as the infringement action is the responsibility of the
patent-holder through his private action.135
The EC tried to justify the introduction of extensive regulations by Chairman
Motta in the Decision of August 30, 2003 by insisting that the existing enforcement
measures under the TRIPS Agreement mainly address the possibility of patent
infringement and not that of trade diversion. According to the EC, the issue of diversion
of a patented product is entirely different from that of the infringement of a patent
and, whereas existing enforcement measures in the TRIPS Agreement deal with the
latter, there are no provisions in the TRIPS Agreement to deal with the issue of the
diversion of a patented product. In this context, as per the EC, the norms prescribed
in the Decision of August 30, 2003 are for prohibiting trade diversion from their
intended destination.136 This is a unique argument, as the patent-holders have so much
of control in the countries where they are producing the goods that no goods
manufactured in developing countries where there has been no patenting have been
exported to the developed countries so far.137 This issue of diversion was exactly the
argument raised by the EC in its dispute against Canada in Canada Patent Protection,
to which the Panel did not agree on the ground that it is the responsibility of the
private infringement action of the patent holder that the challenged conduct is
inconsistent with the basic patent rights created by national laws, not that of the
governments.138
The elaborate formalisation of rules and regulations in the Decision of August
30, 2003 does not appear to have a legal basis either in the TRIPS Agreement or in
the internal domestic law of these countries. What the EC could not gain from the
134
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See Canada Patent Protection, supra note 6, at 7.46.
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Sustainable Trade: Access to Medicines-Main Elements of the Chair’s 16 December 2002
draft compromise decision (Perez Motta text), Brussels (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/trade/csc/memo090103_en.htm.
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See Michael A. Friedman, Henk den Besten, Amir Attaran, Out licensing: A Practical
Approach for Improvement of Access to Medicines in Poor Countries, 361 LANCET 341
(2003).
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Panel decision through the dispute mechanism in Canada Patent Protection, it gained
through Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration negotiations. Changes were introduced
in the Community Patent Convention to say that the import of a patented product
would satisfy the local working requirement on the basis of the Panel’s observation
that Article 30 would be covered by Article 27.1’s non-discrimination provision. This
not only ignores other observations of the same Panel but also attempts to violate the
decisions of the Panel in Canada Patent Protection, which is at least binding on both
the EC and Canada. The attempt by the EC to distinguish between infringement and
diversion after losing the issue of diversion of patented products in Canada Patent
Protection suggests that there is little consistency in international treaty
interpretations or negotiations over TRIPS.

C. Non-Discrimination under Article 30 and Paragraph 6 at Doha
Another important aspect of the proposals of the US and the EC is their argument
that Article 30’s authoritative interpretations to permit export would violate the nondiscrimination provision of Article 27.1. This fails to understand the basis of the Panel’s
observation in Canada Patent Protection, which extended the applicability of nondiscrimination provision in Article 27.1 to Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement and
was in fact based on the acknowledgement from Canada that Article 27.1 would be
applicable to an exemption under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.139 The Panel
observed that since Article 27.1 would be applicable to Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement, it would also be applicable to Article 30 of TRIPS. If Article 27.1 is used to
suggest that it would not be permissible under Article 30 of TRIPS, it cannot be
permissible under Article 31 of TRIPS either, which effectively amounts to saying
that there cannot be any solution at all. No international treaty can be interpreted in
this manner. Moreover, the question of import of unauthorised patented products is
covered by Article 41 of the TRIPS Agreement which explicitly says:
It is understood that this Part does not create any obligations to put in
place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights
distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it
affect the capacity of members to enforce their law in general. Nothing
in this Part creates any obligations with respect to the distribution of
resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and
the enforcement of law in general.
In other words, nations can resort to their own judicial system to block any
diversion of unauthorised patented products.

139

Id.
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D. Exports Under Article 30 of TRIPS and the Limited Exception
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement is an exceptionally important provision in
the TRIPS Agreement because it permits a degree of flexibility to reduce monopolistic
negative externalities and to keep the social welfare purpose of the monopoly granted
through patents on the right track. The Article states:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner,
taking into account the legitimate interests of third parties.
One possible argument to eliminate an Article 30 solution to Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration is to say that manufacture of the patented products for the purpose
of exports would not be covered under the limited exceptions permitted by Article 30
of TRIPS, although this argument was not made either by the EC or the USA. Another
argument to exclude the Article 30 TRIPS solution could be to see whether the limited
exception in Article 30 affects or prejudices the legitimate interest of the patent holder.
The WTO Appellate Body has discussed the interpretation of the term ‘exception’ in
EC-Measures Containing Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 140 in which it
observed:
Merely categorising a treaty provision as an ‘exception’ does not by
itself justify ‘stricter’ or narrower interpretation of that provision than
would be warranted by examination of the ordinary meaning of the
actual treaty words, viewed in context and in the light of the treaty’s
object and purpose, or, in other words, by applying the normal rules of
treaty interpretations.141
In Canada Patent Protection, the Panel, led by Robert Hudec, interpreted the
term “limited exception” in a very narrow sense, although in terms of the interpretation
given by the Appellate Body, its interpretation is incorrect. Even accepting the
restrictive interpretation of the term “limited exception” in Canada Patent Protection
on the basis that the object and purpose of a treaty are irrelevant for treaty
interpretation, the manufacture of patented medicine for approval by the regulatory
authorities is regarded as within the exception of Article 30 as far as TRIPS is
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WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, EC-Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products
(hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WTO Doc. AB-1997-4, and WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan 16, 1998).
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concerned. The manufacture to fulfil the tests requirement for regulatory approval
permitted under the Bolar Exception in the USA,142 by the German Supreme Court in
Clinische I143 and II144 and by the Japanese Supreme Court145 in Ono Pharmaceutical
is regarded as being within the exception permitted under Article 30. Although the
Panel in Canada Patent Protection observed that additional benefits, such as
monopoly for extended period of patents, are within the rights prescribed by Article
28.1 of the TRIPS Agreement without any legal support,146 it found that manufacture
to remove such extended market exclusivity would be covered by the ‘limited exception’
criteria mentioned in Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. What the Panel actually
observed was:
Even though regulatory approval processes may require substantial
amounts for test production to demonstrate reliable manufacturing,
the patent owner’s rights themselves are not impaired any further by
the size of such production runs, as long as they are solely for regulatory
purposes and no commercial use is made of the resulting final
products.147
The commercial use of the final products in the above observation of the Panel
refers to the commercial use in the territory of the patent, not throughout the world.
Once a compulsory licence is issued or where the patent cannot be granted for any
reason, the export of the patented products would not be affected by the limitation
placed by Article 28.1 and would be covered by Article 30 of TRIPS as it does not
affect the patent owner’s right as “no commercial use is made of resulting final
products”.
It must be understood that the term “normal exploitation of the patent” is legally
valid only for the area for which the patent has been granted in view of the territoriality
of the patent and not for the universal exploitation of the patent. If the patented
products are exported out of the patented territory, it does not and cannot conflict
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Bolar Exception, 35 USC. § 271(e) (1994).
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Clinische Versuche I, Federal Supreme Court of Germany [1997] RPC 623, LEXIS UK Patent
Cases 32, BGH, 11th July 1995, GRUR 1996, 109 [Supreme Court] (F.R.G.).
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Ono Pharmaceutical Companies v. Kyoto Pharmaceutical Industries, Case No. 1998 (ju) 153
(Apr. 16,1999) (Decided by the Supreme Court of Japan).
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with the “normal exploitation of the patent”148 nor prejudice the legitimate interests
of the patent owner in the territory of the patent. The European Parliament even
gave “practical embodiment” to Article 30 exceptions to be used to provide access to
such medicines.149 The “limited exception” criteria is not affected by export under
Article 30 of TRIPS to the region where either the patent-holder’s rights were
suspended through issue of a compulsory licence, or the patent-holder has no interest
because the products were not patented. The patent owner does not have access to
the territory to which the goods are exported under compulsory licensing or nongranting of patents, and the patent owner does not have any legitimate commercial
interests therein. This is how TRIPS stands, and this is how it was viewed by the EC
in its concept paper.
148

Daya Shanker, supra note 42, at 769. In John Brown v. Duchesne, 60 US 183, 195 (1886),
the US Supreme Court has interpreted the patenting clause of the US Constitution and
observed:
“The patent laws are authorised by that article in the Constitution which provides that
Congress shall have power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries. The power thus granted is domestic in its character, and necessarily confined
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this particular power. They secure to the inventor a just remuneration from those who
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(emphasis added)”.
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The European Parliament adopted proposals for an Article 30 solution during the first reading
of the draft Directive to update Directive 2001/83/EC relating to medicinal products for
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E. The TRIPS Chairman’s Note and Removal of the Article 30
Solution
By the middle of October 2002, the Chairman of the TRIPS Council, Edouardo
Motta, put forward his proposal in the form of a note which omitted all the proposals
of the developing countries pertaining to Article 30 of TRIPS from the “thematic
compilations”,150 documents in which all the proposals from the various countries
had been put together. This note was put before WTO Members on December 16,
2002 at the Sydney mini-Ministerial Meet but was not accepted. The attempt to remove
the proposals of developing countries completely and to retain those from the USA
regarding the amendment of Article 31(f) with extensive regulatory norms as proposed
by the EC151 was similar to the developments which occurred during the finalisation
of the TRIPS Agreement.152
Daniel Gervais, a former staff member at WIPO and a regular consultant for the
OECD, reproduced some of these developments in his book.153 The arbitrated draft
prepared by the GATT Secretariat, Chairman Anell and Director-General Arthur
Dunkel was included as part of the Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.154 This Draft not only removed
all the references to local working, but also practically all the proposals from developing
countries compiled in MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 dated 23rd July 1990 by Anell155 and
carried through the negotiations in the Brussels Draft Text.156 These developments
150

Thematic Compilation, supra note 89.
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Chairman’s Note dated 25. 10. 2002: Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Draft legal Language for General Council
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by the Chairman of the TRIPS Council on 16th December 2002 Job(02)/217. On 28th August
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6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” contained in document
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JOB(03) /177 to be made by the Chairman of the General Council prior to the adoption of
the Decision. On August 30 the General Council d adopted the Decision in the light of
statement read out by its Chairman (WT/L/40).
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suggest that the system of international negotiations has rarely been equitable, and
that developing countries rarely have any genuine participation in international treaty
negotiations as sovereign countries.
The current developments also appear to follow a predetermined script. All the
proposals related to the Paragraph 6 solution of the Doha Declaration coming from
different countries were put together by the TRIPS Council157 and were discussed by
WTO Members on July 18, 2002 (IP/C/M/36). The suggestions from developing
countries were either removed or curtailed by Motta before he put the proposals in
the Sydney mini-Ministerial Meet through his note, and even more stringent
provisions were included than those in the US or the EC patent laws or their proposals.

F. The TRIPS Chairman’s Note and the Article 31(f) Solution
The Chairman’s Note presented at the Sydney mini-Ministerial Meet158 and
subsequently finalised on August 30, 2003 appears to follow only the proposals from
developed countries. Most of the issues raised by developing countries have been
either removed or circumscribed. It has also attempted to incorporate a series of
regulations on the pretext of diversion and transparency as suggested by the EC and
the USA.
The most disturbing aspect of the Chairman’s note was that the proposals under
Article 30 suggesting authoritative interpretations had been totally removed. The
preamble, which was not drafted on November 19, 2002 but which had been included
in the December 16 version of the Chairman’s Note, says: “Noting that, in the light of
the foregoing, exceptional circumstances exist justifying waivers from the obligations
set out in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement with respect to
pharmaceutical products.” It does not however, mention anything about the Article
30 solution, which was the most suitable and legal solution, and which did not need
any amendment to the TRIPS Agreement. Without mentioning the names of countries,
Motta’s Note further says that “Most of the conditions have been in the context of an
Article 31-based solution (whether through a waiver and/or an amendment) and
therefore most of what follows relates to this scenario.” It is not mentioned who gave
the proposals on the basis of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Except for the USA
157
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158
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and some of the smaller countries like Switzerland, no country proposed amendment
of the Article 31 solution to the exclusion of other solutions. The EC made a proposal
of either amending Article 31 or using Article 30 to cover the export to countries with
no manufacturing capacity. A large number of countries demanded normal use of
Article 30 to fulfil the requirement of access to medicines to countries without the
capacity to manufacture the same, as permitted by the TRIPS Agreement. However,
the introduction of an overtly restrictive amendment by the WTO General Council in
its August 30, 2003 Decision under the pretext of providing easy access of medicines
to needy countries essentially amounts to rewriting TRIPS.
Paragraph 2 of the Chairman’s Note as incorporated in the Decision of August
30, 2003 proposed the inclusion of restrictive norms neither required by the TRIPS
Agreement nor present in any of the existing patent laws of the Member nations. The
Note also appears to cover the proposal from the African countries to extend the
concept of domestic market to the regional blocks, but given the way it has been
drafted and the way it has been subjected to a number of impractical conditions, the
Note as incorporated in the Decision effectively nullified the African proposal.
Apart from its Communications,159 the USA in its attempt to bring finality to
Motta’s Note sent another document to the TRIPS Council saying that the USA “…will
not seek to enforce Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement through the WTO dispute
settlement procedure against a WTO member,” provided that certain conditions
mentioned in the Chairman’s Note are followed.160 The degree of similarity between
the Chairman’s Note and the conditions stated in the US Moratorium is remarkable.

G. Diversion of Patented Products and Imposition of New
Regulations
The Chairman’s Note as fully incorporated in the final Paragraph 6 Solution of
August 30, 2003161 is based on Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and, by removing
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US Second Communication, supra note 66, at 29, which says “While each option suggested
by Members has some merit, at this stage we believe an expeditious, workable, transparent,
sustainable and legally certain solution may more likely be achieved through either a
moratorium for dispute settlement or a waiver of the obligation in TRIPS Article 31(f). A
moratorium or waiver of the obligation of TRIPS Article 31(f) may have several advantages
over other options suggested by Members.”
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the Article 30 TRIPS solution completely, it indicates that developing countries do
not have much of a voice in international negotiations and their presence is only to
provide legitimacy to a treaty. The attempt to restrict the use of Article 30 to facilitate
access to medicines was started by a number of scholars including Alan Sykes,162
Frederick Abbott163 and Gillespie White.164 Sykes stated that developing countries did
not suggest “…that they may rely on Article 30 to deal with the pharmaceutical issue,”165
yet the Draft Ministerial Declaration submitted by the developing countries in
paragraphs 5 and 9 specifically demanded that “[u]nder Article 30 of the TRIPS
Agreement, members may, among others, authorise the production and export of
medicines by persons other than holders of patents on those medicines to address
public health needs in importing members.”166 On the basis of a misunderstanding
that a domestic patent act is applicable internationally, Abbott observed:
The authorisation to make and export under certain conditions might
unreasonably prejudice the interests of the patent holder. An
authorisation to supply a high-income market might under some
circumstances prejudice the interests of the patent holder. An
authorisation regarding a low –income market might unreasonably
prejudice the interests of the patent holder if the exports were
systematically diverted to high-income markets, thereby undermining
the commercial return on the patent.167
Gillespie White reiterated this position.168
The artificial criteria suggested by Abbott of high- and low-income markets appear
to ignore a large body of case law on patents as well as Article 30 of the TRIPS
Agreement. To make and export under Article 30 to fulfil the obligations of Article 31
of another country does not prejudice the interests of the patent-holder in the country
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See Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “solution”,
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of manufacture. The patent-holder in the country of manufacture does not have any
interest where there is no patent for the product or where a compulsory licence has
been issued for any reason, from non-local working to emergency to the other
situations mentioned in Articles 31 and 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. Dealing with
the illegal diversion of such patented products to third countries is the responsibility
of the patent-holder through private action against infringement. It has nothing to
do with the exports under Article 30 of TRIPS to the country with no patenting right
or a country that has suspended patent rights by issuing compulsory licences.
The likelihood of diversion of the patented products manufactured under
compulsory licensing provisions to countries which have patents for the products has
always been present. In the UK, the products produced under compulsory licensing
are specifically permitted to be exported as an encouragement of export and this is
regarded as being a part of the public policy.169 Does Article 31 of TRIPS require that
patented products under compulsory licensing should be of a different colour and
size and have different labelling? Is there any requirement in Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement to inform the WTO or TRIPS Council regarding manufacture and export
of such patented products? The answer to both the above questions is no. The situation
is no different in the case of the manufacture of patented products for export to fulfil
the requirements of countries with no manufacturing capacity, and it does not require
this elaborate and cumbersome procedure in the name of information-gathering and
generating competition among the suppliers.

V. THE LEGALITY OF THE PARAGRAPH 6 SOLUTION
A. Authoritative Interpretations and Exports under Article 30
Paragraph 29 of the USA’s Second Communication questioned the legal merit of
an authoritative interpretation by the Ministerial Council of the WTO. The
inconsistency of this argument becomes apparent when one examines the decision of
the Appellate Body in Japan Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,170 in which the Appellate
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Penn Engineering and Manufacturing Corporation’s Patent, [1973] R.P.C. 233. (Justice
Graham J. in his observation stated “In my judgement, particularly at the present time,
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Body had accepted the USA’s argument that a panel report does not have significance
even as a subsequent practice and stated that authoritative interpretations are the
sole prerogative of the Ministerial Conference and not of the Panel or the Appellate
Body. As observed by the Appellate Body, the adopted Panel report is not even a
“definitive interpretation” of the relevant provisions of GATT 1994.171 The reasoning
given by the Appellate Body is: “There is a specific cause for this conclusion in the
WTO Agreement. Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement provides: ‘The Ministerial
Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt
interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.” Article
IX:2 provides further that such decisions “shall be taken by a three-fourths majority
of the members”. The fact that such an “exclusive authority” in interpreting the treaty
has been established so specifically in the WTO Agreement is reason enough to
conclude that such authority does not exist by implications or by inadvertence
elsewhere.”172 Authoritative interpretations by the Ministerial Conference or the
General Council of the WTO thus cannot be questioned by the Dispute Settlement
Body.
The EC’s attempt to consistently undermine Article 30 of TRIPS is evidenced by
its argument of the societal neutrality of Article 30 in Canada Patent Protection,
which was accepted by the Panel without any contextual support.173 It was with great
difficulty that the developing countries managed to introduce the requisite sensibility
in treaty interpretation through the Doha Declaration by incorporating the fact that
the TRIPS Agreement is to be interpreted in terms of societal values and not in terms
of societal neutrality. By resorting to Article 31(f) solutions for Paragraph 6 in the
Doha Declaration, however, the developed countries appear to have nullified the Doha
Declaration.

B. Article 30 of TRIPS and Judicial Decisions
The USA’s assertion in paragraph 31 of its Second Communication that
“[i]nterpreting Article 30 to allow Members to amend their patent laws to permit
compulsory licenses to be granted to authorise their manufacturers to produce and
export patented pharmaceutical products to other countries”174 is incorrect, not
because there is no provision of issuing compulsory licensing under Article 30 of
171
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TRIPS (if the conditions are satisfied, the patented products can be manufactured
and sold without any case-by-case analysis as in Article 31) or because it was against
Article 4bis of the Paris Convention, but because it is in disregard of its own patent
laws as interpreted by the US Supreme Court and other courts in their judgments.
The USA’s fundamental problem with the Article 30 solution seems to be the nonpayment of remuneration to the patent-holder, which limits multinational companies’
litigation capacity. The developed countries have supported remuneration not because
remuneration is important in itself, but because the question of remuneration would
provide unlimited litigation opportunities, which could apparently be used to block
any use of compulsory licensing.
The inconsistency in the US Second Communication regarding freedom to export
the patented product is reflected in Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram
Corporation,175 in which the US Supreme Court observed: “If Laitram has a right to
suppress Deepsouth’s export trade it must be derived from its patent grant, and thus
from the patent statute. We find that 35 USC. 271, the provision of the patent laws on
which Laitram relies, does not support its claim.”176 Justice Laddie also observed in
the context of copyright, “If the devices (infringing) are to be sold in a country where
manufacture of the unlicensed copies is not proscribed and therefore not objectionable,
there is no compelling reason why the handling of them here should be proscribed.”177
Neither TRIPS nor internal patent laws explicitly or implicitly prohibit the export of
patented products.178 The non-applicability of the exporting monopoly to the export
of patented products would remove the need for reliance on the exceptions permitted
under the TRIPS Agreement, and there is no reason why the Article 31 provision
should be resorted to for this purpose.

C. Article 30 of TRIPS and Extraterritoriality in US Patent Act
The US’s First and Second Communications also appear to be attempts to
introduce amendments to the internal patent law of the USA through international
negotiations.179 In 1994, using the TRIPS negotiations framework, through the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act,180 the US Patent Act was made far more restrictive
than it was before by including the introduction of the terms “importing”, and “offering
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Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corporation, 406 US 518 (1972).
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Id. at 528.
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Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v. Ball, [2004] EWHC 1984 (Ch), 21.
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See Daya Shanker, Paragraph 6 Solution of the Doha Declaration and Exports under the
TRIPS Agreement, 7 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 365 (2004).
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Pub. L. No. 103-465, ss. 532, 533, 108 Stat. 4809, 4983-90 (1994).
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for sale”, and extending the patenting period to twenty years. 181 Barfield and
Groombridge asserted that the importation amendment provides “full statutory
backing for United States patent holders to block parallel imports”,182 which is rather
an incongruous assumption.183 This use of international negotiations to incorporate
expansive restrictions in the patent laws of developing countries appears to be an
extraterritorial expansion of the patent laws of developed countries. In spite of the
introduction of clauses (f) and (g) in § 271, the extraterritoriality of the US Patent Act
has so far been interpreted in a limited manner by US courts, and the US Supreme
Court has held that the US Congress is not empowered by the US Constitution to
extend its patenting act beyond its borders.184
The term “normal exploitation” of a patent pertains to the commercial exploitation
in the territory of the patent, and would not cover the situations where the patented
products do not affect the commercial marketplace. By insisting that movement of
the patented products outside the territory of the patent would affect the normal
exploitation of the patent, the USA is suggesting that the effect of the patent extends
outside the territory of the patent, a concept not permitted by the territoriality
enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement through Article 4bis of the Paris Convention and

181

As amended by the Uruguay Round Amendment Act, Patent Act, § 154 (a) (1) says: “Every
patent shall contain a short title of the invention and grant to the patentee, his heirs or
assignees, the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States,
and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale
or selling throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products made
by that process, referring to the specifications of the particulars thereof. 35 USC. s. 154(a)(1).
§ 271(a), as amended, provide: [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this title whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States
or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefore, infringes the patent 35 USC. § 271 (a).”
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in the USA by its Constitution.185 A number of decisions by the US Court of Appeals
have also followed the principle of the territorial limits of the patents. For example,
in Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York v. Roche Diagnostics,186
Columbia University tried to extend the effect of the US Patent Act’s extraterritoriality
by arguing that Roche was liable under § 271(a) because an American company owned
the cell lines used by Roche in Germany, and because Roche imported serum-free
EPO, a by-product of the Axel patents, into the USA. The argument was rejected as
“suggesting that ownership status transcends geographical boundaries”. 187
So far, § 271(f) of the US Patent Act has been strictly interpreted as applicable
only to component parts. 188 § 271(b) appears to extend the US Patent Act to
extraterritorial situations, such as inducement to direct infringement within the United
States. Although the Federal Appeals Court in Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb189
decided that such extraterritorial activity to encourage and advance the infringement
should be accompanied with actual intent, circumstantial evidence was found to be
sufficient to show such intent.190 From the discussion in Hauni Werke Koerber & Co.
v. Molins,191 it appears that the observation of the US Supreme Court in Strassheim v.
Daily,192 a case dealing with two states within the USA, has been interpreted as
permitting extraterritorial use of § 271(b) of the US Patent Act dealing with inducement
to infringe. Although the Court did not decide the extraterritoriality of § 271(b) in
Hauni Werke Koerber and its observation can thus at most be regarded as obiter
dicta, the injunctive relief under § 283 of the US Patent Act has been interpreted as
having extraterritorial implications.193 It is worth noting here that the US Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit declined to expand the territoriality of the US Patent
Act in Johns Hopkins University v. Cell Pro194 when it observed that “neither export
185

Id.
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Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York v. Roche Diagnostics, 150 F. Supp.
2d 191 (D. Mass. 2001).
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from the United States nor use in a foreign country of a product covered by a United
States patent constitutes infringement.”195 Thus, apart from limiting the patenting
monopoly to the territory concerned, the export of patented products from the USA
itself does not violate the US Patent Act. Thus, PhRMA and the USTR appear to be
attempting to influence domestic patent legislation by introducing the idea that export
would violate patent protection under Articles 28 and 30 of the TRIPS Agreement,
and by insisting on introducing a plethora of regulations apparently to control
diversion (and thus infringement) through an amendment in TRIPS.

D. The Paragraph 6 Solution and Its Legitimacy
The Paragraph 6 Solution arrived at by the members of the WTO on August 30,
2003 raises a number of important legal questions. Throughout the negotiations, the
EC spoke of the amendment of Article 31 as one of the solutions of the Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration. In fact, the USA questioned the whole concept of authoritative
interpretation by the Ministerial Conference as being of dubious significance,196 in
spite of the fact that the WTO Appellate Body in Japan Alcohol had categorically
stated that the Ministerial Conference’s authoritative interpretation is binding on
every WTO Member, unlike a decision of either the Panel or the Appellate Body. 197
On August 30, 2003, eleven days before the Ministerial Conference was to open at
Cancun, the General Council decided that the Article 31 solution prepared by the
Chairman of the TRIPS Council was the most appropriate option.198 This solution
and the accompanying statement of the Chairman of the General Council prescribing
procedures199 not only waived the obligations set out in paragraphs (f) and (h) of
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement as per the preamble of the Decision, but also
prescribed detailed procedures regarding the manufacture, movement and sale of
the goods manufactured or to be manufactured to fulfil the requirements of the
countries which do not have sufficient manufacturing capacity for such drugs.
A simple reading of the Marrakesh Agreement makes it abundantly clear that
neither the General Council nor the Chairman of the General Council is authorised to
waive the conditions or amend the provisions of TRIPS by adding or subtracting any
of the provisions. The question of either of these authorities introducing conditions
does not arise in any situation. Article IX(2) permits both the Ministerial Conference
and the General Council to authoritatively interpret the provisions of the WTO,
195

Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, 152 F.3d 1342, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

196
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whereas paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of Article IX permit only the Ministerial Conference to
waive any of the provisions. Although Article IV(2) of the Marrakesh Agreement says
that in “the intervals between meetings of the Ministerial Conference, its functions
shall be conducted by the General Council”, this authorisation cannot be interpreted
to extend to each and every provision of the Marrakesh Agreement containing a
reference to the Ministerial Conference, nor is it a correct interpretation to allow the
General Council to take over when a Ministerial Conference is only days away. Such
an interpretation would render any reference to the Ministerial Conference in Article
IX(2) superfluous. There is also no mention at all of powers being given to the
Chairman of the General Council to introduce conditions in the decisions taken either
by the Ministerial Conference or by the General Council. The authority to conduct
routine functions of the Ministerial Conference given to the General Council cannot
extend to the decision-making authority of the Ministerial Conference; and, even if
the General Council takes such decisions, they have to be confirmed and ratified by
the Ministerial Conference. In the August 30, 2003 Decision, the General Council
has not only taken a decision it is not authorised to take, it has also eliminated the
Ministerial Conference from further monitoring the waiver through Paragraph 8 of
the Decision, which says:
The Council for TRIPS shall review annually the functioning of the
system set out in this Decision with a view to ensuring its effective
operation and shall annually report on its operation to the General
Council. This review shall be deemed to fulfil the review requirements
of Article IX:4 of the WTO Agreement.200
There is no mention at all in the Marrakesh Agreement of any means by which
the Chairman of the General Council may be permitted to introduce conditions in the
decisions taken either by the Ministerial Conference or by the General Council. The
decision to waive the conditions of Articles 31(f) and 31(h) is not legally appropriate.
The waiver of Article 31(h) does not apply with respect to countries which do not
have manufacturing capacity or which have issued compulsory licensing under Article
5A of the Paris Convention for non-working or insufficient working of the patent.
The waiver is, at best, applicable specifically to Article 31(f), which says that the

200

On 28th August 2003, the Council for TRIPS approved the Draft Decision on “Implementation
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health”
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patented products manufactured under Article 31 should be “predominantly” for
domestic consumption. The term “predominantly” has been defined in various
dictionaries as frequently or mostly.201 The meaning of “predominantly”, used by
Frederick Abbott to refer to more than fifty percent of production was thus not
appropriate, as mentioned by Abbott himself.202 The principle of effectiveness in
interpretation of international treaty demands that the provisions of a treaty must

201

Abbott selected a definition of the word “predominantly” on the basis of the New Shorter
Oxford Dictionary which defined predominantly as “(1) Having supremacy or ascendancy
over others, predominating. (2) Constituting the main or strongest element, prevailing.
(3) Rising High over.” (at 2329) as a major part or majority and insisted the reading of the
word “predominantly” as “more than fifty percent of the production by a compulsory licence
[which] should be intended for supply of the domestic market of the Member granting the
licence.” This particular meaning of the word predominant was most non-compatible with
the context of the exemption under Article 31. Abbott himself mentioned that “The difficulty
with this interpretation is that it potentially reduces the term “predominantly” to a nullity,
for example, if there were 80 Members receiving supplies under compulsory licence, perhaps
only two percent (2%) might need to be supplied to the market of the member granting the
licence to maintain its predominance.” In international treaty negotiations such type of
interpretations are not permitted. In Indonesia Automobile (WTO, Report of the Panel,
Indonesia Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS55/
R, WT/DS/59/R and WT/DS64/R, dated 2 July 1998) based on the Vienna Convention, the
Panel observed “In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant
to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given
meaning using the ordinary meaning of words” to avoid turning them into nullity.
The ordinary meaning of “predominantly” in Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary is
“mostly” or “mainly.” The dictionary meaning of the term “Predominant” in Collier’s
Dictionary which is also published as Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English,
Third College Editing (1994) means “1. having ascendancy, authority or dominating influence
2. to be dominant in amount , number, etc. 3, most frequent. Thus the normal meaning of
predominantly can be read as mostly or mainly or frequently. The normal meaning given to
the word predominantly does not prohibit export of the patented products manufactured
under compulsory licensing. It just says such manufacture mainly should be for domestic
consumption and does not stipulate that it is to be measured in quantity as suggested by
Frederick Abbott.

Using the ordinary meaning of the word predominantly as mainly or mostly, there is no
obligation that is to be waived and the waiver just becomes superfluous and has essentially
been used to impose obligations where there have been no such obligations.
202
See generally Frederick Abbott, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health Needs: The TRIPS
Agenda at the WHO after the Doha Declaration on Public Health, Quaker United Nations
Office- Geneva, Occasional Paper 9, February 2002, p. 26 available at http://
www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/OP9%20Abbott1.pdf; Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem? 7 J. INT’L ECO. L.,
73, 78 (2004).
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have meaning to avoid them turning into a nullity.203 If the ordinary meaning of the
word “predominantly” – mostly – is used, there can be no ban on manufacture and
export under a compulsory licence issued under Article 31(f) of more than fifty percent
as suggested by Abbott.

VI. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND RELEVANCE
OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
A. The Paragraph 6 Solution and Power as Exclusion
Negotiations regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration show the presence
of tendencies which suggest the use of primitive power in international negotiations
as discussed by Prof. Robert Hudec. 204 He observes that “international legal
arrangements have relatively more in common with laws of primitive societies studied
by anthropologists, in which litigation is still emerging as a rather tenuous alternative
to dispute resolution by force.”205
The absence of meaningful participation by developing countries in the WTO
negotiations, particularly TRIPS, has been discussed by a number of scholars. Gathii
used Susan Strange’s definition of structural power as the ability to set “the rules of

WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS/9, adopted 20th may 1996, p. 23 Principle of EffectivenessOne of the important observations of the Appellate Body in Alcoholic Beverages is that of
the principle of effectiveness (ut res valeat quam pereat) which was determined as a
“fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation” flowing from the general rule of interpretation
set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. In United States – Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, the Appellate Body observed that “one of the corollaries of the
‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give
meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading
that would result in reducing whole classes or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or
inutility”.
204
See Robert Hudec, “Transcending the Ostensible”: Some Reflections on the Nature of
Litigations Between Governments, 72 MINN. L. R. 211, 212 (1987 ).
205
See also Meinhard Hilf, Power, Rules and Principles – Which Orientation for WTO/GATT
Law?, J. INT’L. ECO. L. 111 (2001); Karin Mickelson, Third World Voices in International
Discourse, 16 WIS. INT’L L. J., 353, 413 (1998). Mickelson says, “Third World writers are
frequently characterised as having tremendous faith in the ability of law in general, and
international law in particular, to institute social justice. Yet these writers are well aware of
the ways in which law has been made to serve the interests of the powerful, and there is
something quixotic in their attempts to transform what is perceived as an essentially
oppressive discourse into a liberatory one.”
203
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the game”206 to argue that, “[t]o the extent that patents are therefore a barrier to
access antiretrovirals, the TRIPS Agreement is no more than a form of structural
power.”207 This ability to set the rules of the game becomes apparent in the context of
TRIPS when one observes that the USA and the EC initiated twenty-one of the twentythree WTO complaints under TRIPS; the remaining two, by Brazil and Canada, were
reaction complaints against the United States and EC, initiated to gain some
bargaining power.208 However, Drahos based his argument regarding the TRIPS
Agreement on “unequal power relations and disparities in information and
organisational resources.”209 He identified four basic sources of power in the context
of international treaty negotiations. These are: (1) the market power of the powerful
states such as the USA; (2) commercial intelligence networks, which includes a state’s
trade bureaucracy, its business organisations and its individual corporations; (3)
enrolment power, which Drahos defined as a state’s capacity to enrol state and nonstate actors in a coalition; and (4) a state’s domestic institutions restricting its
negotiators within certain norms, which is exemplified by the European Commission,
which deals specifically with trade issues.210
Drahos is supported by Shaffer, who discussed inequality in international
negotiations in the context of reduction in developing countries’ “participation in the
international trade dispute settlement system in complaints against developed
countries” in the WTO, compared to their relative participation under the less legalised
GATT.211 Following Drahos, Shaffer also suggested that developing countries must
pool their resources through national, regional and international centres specialising
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in trade-related intellectual property issues, as well as through developing closer
relations with the US and EC domestic institutions to neutralise the clout of large
pharmaceutical firms and work with generic pharmaceutical industries in their own
countries. However, Shaffer did not appear to be hopeful of the success of such policies
in the presence of the “extra-legal coercion” that the United States and, to a lesser
extent, the EC could employ.212 Steinberg also discussed the inequality in the WTO
negotiations, attributing it to the lack of market power of developing countries
compared to that of the USA and EC, along with the lack of internal transparency.213
However, the power structure discussed by Gathii, Drahos, Shaffer and others
misses the point that power is not limited to its structural formulations, but also
comprehensively affects the relationship between developed and developing countries,
and that it is not the inability of the developing countries to form a coherent group
which undermines their negotiating capabilities, but rather the fact that power comes
with a string of negatives such as exclusion, rejection, barriers, denial and
dissimulation, which prohibits the formation of a coherent group capable of resisting
the unrestricted use of power by developed countries. 214 This development can be
seen during the TRIPS negotiations, where India and Brazil were isolated and pushed
into submission through the use of Special 301 by the USA. Similar developments
were witnessed during the paragraph 6 negotiations when African countries
disassociated themselves from the main group for no apparent reason or benefit.
The developments leading up to the Paragraph 6 solution suggest that developing
countries are not in a position to participate effectively and meaningfully in
international treaty negotiations. The weakness of developing countries becomes
evident when in their Draft Ministerial Declaration, they found themselves forced to
protect themselves by requesting that each member “shall refrain from imposing or
threatening to impose sanctions and refrain from employing the grant of incentives
or other benefits in a manner which could curtail the ability of developing and least
developed country Members to avail themselves of every possible policy option to
protect and promote public health.”215 This weakness is further illustrated by paragraph

212

See id. at 476.
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6(h) in the Proposal from the African Countries,216 which says that bilateral and
multilateral treaties should not be used to remove the flexibilities provided in the
TRIPS Agreement.217 The Revised Bangui Agreement between sixteen of the world’s
poorest African countries, which included exceptionally strict patenting provisions
at the behest of WIPO as its technical consultant, is another example of the way in
which these countries’ sovereignties have been compromised at such negotiations.218
The developing countries’ proposals in the Doha Round were simply a reaffirmation
of TRIPS as interpreted in terms of customary rules of interpretation, along with an
attempt to introduce the rule of law and decency in international agreements; yet
even this was rejected at the negotiations, despite the fact that no amendment to any
of the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement was requested: it was only a question of
simple interpretation in terms of Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. To deal
with such a request by attempting to introduce amendments to Article 31 and
institutionalising an elaborate and extensive procedure to nullify the flexibilities
present in TRIPS practically amounts to rewriting TRIPS.
Both Drahos and Gathii have described the power relationship between developed
and developing countries appropriately, but the concept of power has another aspect
in terms of Foucaultian perceptions of power. The underlying power not only sets
ever-shrinking boundaries for less powerful nations but also significantly affects the
group-formation behaviour of weaker nations and eliminates any possible significant
resistance from a cohesive, goal-driven group.219 This aspect of dysfunctional group
behaviour became apparent when the African nations left the main group of
developing countries during the final phase of submission and made their own
submissions. It appears that the African nations made a separate deal with the USA
which removed the possibility of an Article 30 solution for the Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration from the discussion. The Paragraph 6 solution included a diluted
version of the African proposal of treating the regional grouping as a single market,
which anyway should not have been a disputable issue even otherwise. The United
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States and the five member countries of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
– Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa – launched a free trade
agreement on June 2, 2003 (South Africa also has a free trade agreement with the
European Union). If other recent free trade agreements with the USA are any indicator,
this free trade agreement will expand the industrial and other monopolies in SACU
member countries, some of which are the world’s main suppliers of gold and diamonds
and are being mostly controlled by Western mining interests. These countries do not
appear to have gained any advantage from this free trade agreement, and the USA’s
motives seem to be clear from Robert Zoellick’s letter to Congress in which he stated:
“We also see the negotiations (US-SACU Free Trade Agreement) as an opportunity to
advance US objectives for the multilateral negotiations currently underway in the
World Trade Organisation (WTO).”220

B. The Process of Power
Although inequality in international treaty negotiations and in subsequent
interpretations of such treaties is clearly evident, what has not been discussed at length
is how this power actually gets transformed into concrete unilateral documents. One
example of this is the Argentina US Mutually Agreed Solution, which was a result of
Argentina agreeing to all of the USA’s demands under the auspices of the WTO’s
Dispute Settlement Understanding because of the pressure of its International
Monetary Fund loan, which affected Argentina’s financial institutions and caused a
considerable amount of economic vulnerability. Once Argentina entered into the
Mutually Agreed Solution with the USA pertaining to patenting issues which were
not even in the complaint submitted by the USA to the DSU, the repayment was
apparently postponed.221 Similarly, the USA’s use of Special 301 played a significant
role in Brazil’s capitulation during the TRIPS negotiations. However, the factors during
the finalisation of the August 30, 2003 decision were quite different. There was no
apparent use of Special 301 and no visible sign of IMF or World Bank interference.
One possible reason for the capitulation of negotiators from developing countries is
their weakness and susceptibilities to various attractions. There is no direct evidence
of any outright corruption but the circumstances – the fact that the General Council
allowed the Paragraph 6 Solution as prepared by Eduardo Motta on the basis of the
US and EC proposals to be passed just eleven days before the Cancun Ministerial
Meet, which was the authorised forum for any decision pertaining to the waiver of

220

Robert B. Zoellick, USTR Notifies Congress Administration Intends to Initiate Free Trade
Negotiations with Sub-Saharan Nations, (May 11, 2002) available at http://www.ustr.gov/
Document_Library/Letters_to_Congress/2002/USTR_Notifies_Congress_Admini.

221

See generally, Daya Shanker, Argentina-US Mutually Agreed Solution, Economic Crisis in
Argentina and Failure of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 44 IDEA 565 (2004).

62

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

the conditions of Article 31, suggests that the negotiators did not maintain much
transparency or rectitude during this negotiation. No reason has been given by any of
the major developing countries to date regarding their total abandonment of the Article
30 solution. The use of Article 30 to manufacture and export the patented product
does not need any authoritative interpretations at all. Any manufacture which did
not affect the commercial market place of the patent holder in the territory of the
patent could have easily been brought within the Article 30 exceptions. The total
abandonment of any Article 30 solution by the developing countries’ negotiators
without any explanation points to some amount of corruption and compromise,
howsoever small, involving the use of influence by the interested parties, including
the Western pharmaceutical industry. The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
adopted in 1999 describes such use of influence as a corrupt act.222 Former UN
Secretary-General Annan argued that corruption undermines the rule of law,223 but
there is also another question that arises: if the rule of law can be undermined in such
a manner, is there not a need for a change in the system that permits it?
An important factor to consider is the economic influence of multinational
corporations, who were active participants in the Paragraph 6 negotiations and seem
to have played a role in the incorporation of exports as one of the patenting rights in
the Paragraph 6 solution. Webb, while discussing the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption, observed:
“…the huge economic influence of multinational corporations (MNCs)
and the consequent leverage they have in relation to states, means that
they are an actor that cannot be excluded from an international
anticorruption strategy… These powerful non-state actors can make
deals with developing country governments that represent a sizable
share of a state’s national income or resource endowments; they often
negotiate with top public officials and, if it is a corrupt environment,
the MNC must decide whether to participate actively, quietly refuse to
deal, or report the corruption.”224
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The vulnerabilities and susceptibilities of the negotiators from developing
countries can be reduced, if not completely eliminated, by introducing transparency
in international negotiations, the lack of which has proved to be its Achilles’ heel.
Given the absence of any explanation from the Third World negotiators regarding
the change of position during the TRIPS and Paragraph 6 negotiations, the explanation
that TRIPS was the handiwork of Arthur Dunkel and Lars Anell and that the Paragraph
6 solution was the handiwork of Eduardo Motta and others in the TRIPS Council and
the General Council would not cut much ice with the general public. To combat this,
there should be a statute similar to the USA’s Freedom of Information Act, which
provides access to the information relating to such negotiations. For example, through
the use of the Freedom of Information Act, the Center for International Environmental
Law gained access to the documents leading to the US-Chile Free Trade Agreement.225
The absence of transparency in such negotiations, particularly on the part of the
developing countries’ negotiators, is a continued threat to the sovereignty and
independence of the developing countries.

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Patenting in the context of access to medicines, particularly with respect to HIV
sufferers from Africa, Asia and Latin America, has become a grave issue, which was
exacerbated when a number of countries had to introduce strict patenting provisions
under TRIPS which resulted in a large section of the world population not being able
to access medicines at affordable prices. This resulted in the developing countries’
proposal that the manufacture and export of medicines under the Article 30 exemption
should cover a situation where a number of countries issuing compulsory licences do
not have sufficient manufacturing capacity to produce such medicines. During the
Ministerial Conference at Doha, this request was not accepted by the developed
countries, and the matter was referred to the TRIPS Council as Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on Public Health. A number of proposals were subsequently
submitted to the TRIPS Council by various countries. The proposals from developed
countries were based on modifications to Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and
added a host of extra regulations, whereas the developing countries mostly wanted
225
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authoritative interpretations of Article 30 to permit such activities. The common
elements of the two sets of proposals were that the export of patented products would
be restricted under TRIPS.
The major issue, however, is that a patent should not be granted that where the
patented goods cannot be manufactured, i.e., enabled, since the limited monopoly
extended to patented products is for the advancement of science and is not to be
treated as property in itself. The incapacity to manufacture would also invite issue of
compulsory licences for failure to work under Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention.
Since patenting is completely territorial under Article 4bis of the Paris Convention
and the export of patented products cannot hurt the interests of the patent-holder in
a country where the said patent right either does not exist or has been suspended,
there is no merit in the USA’s assertions that Article 30 of TRIPS would be violated.
The exclusion of the developing countries’ proposals by the Chairman Motta from his
Note and from the final Paragraph 6 solution, echoing the exclusion of their proposals
from TRIPS, is condemnable; and its legal basis is questionable. This marginalisation
of developing countries’ views is a result of the manipulation and coercion of MNCs
and developed countries, as well as the vulnerabilities of the negotiators from
developing countries. In the wake of the HIV pandemic, the urgent need for drugs in
countries that do not have the requisite manufacturing capacity is more than ever
before, and developing countries are often put in a position where they are forced to
compromise to get some access to medicines rather than none at all, a situation that
is clearly unacceptable given the state of the pandemic in developing regions such as
sub-Saharan Africa. If international instruments are to be truly “international” in
nature, then the voices of developing countries need to be taken note of and not
brushed aside when drafting a final document that will be binding on those very
countries. Since the voluntary introduction of transparency in international
negotiations has not occurred, a freedom of information statute at an international
level would help to combat this problem and prevent obligations from being
unilaterally imposed on developing countries in the way that the Paragraph 6 solution
and TRIPS before it were.

